
DECADES OF DATA: EUROPE EX UK

1900-2019





Executive Summary

- Basing investment decisions on the extrapolation of capital markets returns from recent, relatively short periods is a common mistake. Viable conclusions about long-term expected returns cannot be drawn from return data for periods shorter than several decades, and even then, investors should be mindful that long-term statistics are beginning- and end-point sensitive and that returns are more variable than commonly assumed. Still, consideration of shorter time periods within a longer-term context can provide a powerful framework for evaluating current market conditions.
- Eurozone equities (26.1%) advanced in 2019 to new all-time highs, in contrast to negative performance in 2018. Eurozone shares gained the most since calendar year 2009, with 2019's performance ranking 14th best out of the 69 calendar years since 1951. Such strong performance for Eurozone stocks is not necessarily uncommon. Eurozone stocks have earned double-digit returns in 40 calendar years over that same timespan, more than half of the time. Investors might reasonably expect a market pullback in the subsequent year following such strong returns; however, the data show that strong performance can continue. In fact, in the initial calendar year following 26%+ market gains, Eurozone stocks posted double-digit positive returns in seven out of 13 years, and declined in only four of those years, for an overall subsequent calendar year average of about 13%.
- In the decade closed at the end of 2019, Eurozone equities posted returns below their very long-term averages. Investors in Eurozone stocks have earned a nominal average annual compound return (AACR) of 6.7% over the past ten years. For the full period analyzed, Eurozone equities (1951–2019) have fared better, posting a nominal AACR of 10.5%. Recent below-average performance has persisted for some time; the rolling ten-year AACR for Eurozone equities has been below the full period average for the past 13 years. However, investors should bear in mind that rolling AACR analyses are sensitive to beginning- and end-point timing, even over ten-year periods. Monthly rolling ten-year AACRs reached 9.9% through February 2019, which was their strongest ten-year rolling return since the period ended May 2007, but still below average. One major reason that period posted relatively stronger returns is that the worst months from the global financial crisis (GFC) fell out of the data set, as the ten-year window began when Eurozone equities hit a nadir in March 2009.

Executive Summary (continued)

- Eurozone equities, bonds, and cash all outpaced inflation over very long-term periods, based on data since the mid-20th century. Over rolling 50-year periods, real AACRs for Eurozone stocks ranged from a low of 3.7% to a high of 8.7%, outpacing inflation by the widest margin. Eurozone bonds and cash also gained in real terms, even during the weakest performance periods, with returns ranging from 1.8% to 3.5% and from 0.3% to 0.8%, respectively. Eurozone inflation has averaged 3.7% annually since 1950, roughly in line with other developed economies. For comparison, benchmark Eurozone government bonds and cash produced full-period AACRs of 5.9% and 3.8%, respectively, over the same time span, which is a significantly narrower spread vis-à-vis inflation relative to stocks versus inflation. Still, given today's unprecedented low yields, Eurozone cash may have a more difficult time outpacing inflation in the years ahead. With negative central bank policy rates, even low inflation can eat away at purchasing power.
- Over the long term, Eurozone equity investors have a high probability of being compensated for the additional risk of holding stocks. Since 1950, Eurozone equity returns exceeded bond returns during 68% of all five-year periods, 75% of all ten-year periods, and 95% of all 25-year periods (calculated on a nominal basis using rolling monthly data). While equities tend to outperform in the long term, there have been sustained periods of underperformance over rolling five-year periods, as volatile equities are prone to larger drawdowns than bonds. Such periods are a reminder of the ballast fixed income allocations can provide to portfolios in terms of diversification.
- Earnings growth and dividend reinvestment are the primary contributors to equity total return over time, while the effects of valuation mean reversion diminish the impact of multiple rerating. Earnings growth provided the highest degree of return contribution since 1969, on average, but can vary significantly from decade to decade. Dividends provide a steady stream of reliable income, but their contribution is weaker in magnitude, comprising only about half the contribution provided by earnings. In the decade closed at the end of 2019, contributions from earnings growth exceeded that of dividend reinvestment by nearly 3x, while multiple contraction detracted from performance for the second consecutive decade.

Executive Summary (continued)

- Starting valuations are a useful indicator for long-term (ten+ years) subsequent equity returns, but the relationship is somewhat weaker over shorter time horizons. Normalized valuations and subsequent returns have a stronger relationship over long time periods (e.g., ten-year subsequent returns), but starting valuations alone do not completely explain subsequent returns—many factors can influence equity performance. Since 1979, our cyclically adjusted price-to-cash earnings (CAPCE) ratio for Europe ex UK stocks has explained 74% of the variation in subsequent ten-year real returns, a strong yet imperfect guide to future returns. At December 31, 2019, Europe ex UK equity valuations ended in the 84th percentile of historical observations, and from this valuation decile the median subsequent ten-year real return for equities has been only about 1.5% per annum.
- High- or low-valuation environments alone are not a catalyst for market reversals and may persist for several years; waiting for valuations to mean revert can be an exercise in frustration. Low valuations provide what famed investment analyst Benjamin Graham called "a margin of safety." High valuations, on the other hand, typically price in lofty projections for the future, providing little room for error. Despite uncertainty regarding the timing of market reversals, the historical record for Eurozone equities is clear—periods of low valuations are followed by higher long-term subsequent returns, while periods of high valuations are followed by poorer long-term returns.
- Europe ex UK equity dividend yields are not statistically related to subsequent performance; normalized valuations are the more useful indicator. Europe ex UK dividend yields explained only 18% of the variation in subsequent ten-year real AACRs over the past 50 years, which pales in comparison to the explanatory power of normalized valuations. For example, from the 2019 year-end dividend yield of 3.1%, the range of subsequent Europe ex UK equity real ten-year returns was about 20 percentage points, which does not instill confidence in forecasting exercises based solely on dividend yields. Despite the weak statistical relationship, dividend yields and subsequent returns display the expected positive relationship, in that higher starting dividend yields (i.e., lower equity prices relative to dividends) have typically been associated with higher subsequent ten-year returns relative to long-term averages. But the wide range of outcomes tells us that dividend yields fail to capture the whole picture, and many other factors influence equity market returns.

Executive Summary (continued)


- Subsequent nominal ten-year Eurozone bond returns closely track the starting yield. Eurozone bond yields turned negative in 2019 and ended the year just barely positive, implying that future long-term returns are likely to be low. In August 2019, Eurozone ten-year government bond yields fell to their lowest month end levels on record (-0.57%) and ended the year at 0.12%. There is no comparable period of such low yield levels in the Eurozone, but if the strong correlation between starting yields and subsequent performance observed since 1970 (correlation coefficient=0.83) is a guide, Eurozone bonds are likely to post flat returns in the ensuing ten years. Additionally, low but positive price inflation will likely result in losses in real terms. While investors benefitted from falling yields over the past 40 years, with Eurozone bonds returning 7.4% annualized since 1981, the current low-yield environment poses a major headwind to forward returns.
- Although rising interest rates are commonly viewed as detrimental to equity prices, this is not necessarily the case—the drivers of change in interest rates, rather than their outright levels or the amount of changes in the rates, are what impact equity returns. Stocks can rise amid rising bond yields if such yields reflect improving growth conditions or increasing consumer confidence. In fact, a positive, albeit weak, statistical relationship exists between short-term interest rates and subsequent ten-year returns in the Eurozone, counter to what one would expect. While history suggests that bill yields are not a significant consideration in developing a Eurozone equity outlook, it is hard to argue against the fact that ultra-easy monetary policy in the recent decade has supported stock performance. However, we have few data examining subsequent long-term equity performance from such low starting interest rate levels.
- Eurozone economic growth has slowed in recent years following back-to-back recessions during the GFC and European Debt Crisis. This slow economic growth appears to have impacted company fundamentals. Real EPS levels for Europe ex UK equities peaked in January 2008 and remain more than 30% below such levels as of year-end 2019. One profitability metric, return on equity, has remained mostly below historical median levels since 2009. Banking reforms following these two financial crises likely weighed on fundamentals, as European equities are highly exposed to the financial sector. Also, austerity measures implemented after the European debt crisis posed a headwind to economic growth despite extraordinarily loose monetary policy. While the US yield curve is widely viewed as a leading economic indicator, the Eurozone yield curve (ten-year/three-month yield spread) is not as reliable in presaging economic downturns. Still, the Eurozone curve has flattened over the past decade and inverted in 2019 for the first time since 1992, based on month-end levels.

The range of investment returns narrows as holding periods increase


RANGE OF EQUITY, BOND, AND CASH RETURNS FOR VARIOUS ROLLING MONTHLY TIME HORIZONS

1951-2019 • Average Annual Compound Return (%)

Nominal Returns



Real Returns




^{*} Axis capped for scaling purposes.

Sources: Global Financial Data, Inc. and Thomson Reuters Datastream.

Equities outperform bonds and cash over the long term, but can underperform in the short run

EXCESS RETURNS OF EQUITIES OVER BONDS AND CASH

1951–2019 • Number of Rolling Monthly Periods




Source: Global Financial Data, Inc.

Eurozone bonds tend to outperform cash, particularly over longer periods


EXCESS RETURNS OF BONDS OVER CASH

1951–2019 • Number of Rolling Monthly Periods



Equities outperform bonds and cash by a wide margin; bonds outperform cash to a lesser degree


AACR OF ROLLING MONTHLY 3-YR RETURN DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN EQUITY, BOND, AND CASH RETURNS



AACR OF ROLLING MONTHLY 3-YR RETURN DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN BOND AND CASH RETURNS



Stock and bond correlation remains near historical lows



Equity performance exhibits mean reversion, but above- or below-average returns can persist


ROLLING MONTHLY EQUITY TOTAL RETURN 10-YR AACR

1960-2019 • Percent (%)

Nominal Returns




Real Returns



Weak but slightly inverse relationship between past and future performance

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROLLING QUARTERLY 10-YR EQUITY REAL AACR AND SUBSEQUENT 10-YR EQUITY REAL AACR

1951-2019 • Percent (%)



Attempting to time the market carries significant risk


CUMULATIVE REAL WEALTH ABSENT WORST QUARTERS

1951-2019 • January 1, 1951 = 100 • AACR (%) in Parentheses

(14.1%) 888,823 (10.5%)(8.5%)(6.5%)Full Period Absent 4 Worst Absent 10 Worst Absent 30 Worst Quarters Quarters Quarters

CUMULATIVE REAL WEALTH ABSENT BEST QUARTERS

1951-2019 • January 1, 1951 = 100 • AACR (%) in Parentheses



^{*} Cumulative real wealth absent 30 best quarters is -13.


Sources: Global Financial Data, Inc. and Thomson Reuters Datastream.

Note: Cumulative real wealth is shown on a logarithmic scale.

Interregional equity correlations have increased, but turned slightly lower in the past decade

ROLLING 10-YR CORRELATIONS: EUROPE EX UK EQUITY VS GLOBAL PEERS

December 31, 1960 – December 31, 2019 • Correlation Coefficient




CORRELATION MATRIX

January 31, 1951 - December 31, 2019

	Europe ex UK	US	UK	Japan	EM
Europe ex UK	1.00				
US	0.64	1.00			
UK	0.68	0.55	1.00		
Japan	0.42	0.34	0.29	1.00	
EM	0.63	0.67	0.62	0.50	1.00

Sources: FTSE International Limited, Global Financial Data, Inc., MSCI Inc., Standard & Poor's, and Thomson Reuters Datastream. MSCI data provided "as is" without any express or implied warranties.


Earnings growth and valuation multiple rerating vary over time; dividends are more stable



High valuations imply weak subsequent returns and vice versa

CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED PRICE-TO-CASH EARNINGS RATIOS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 10-YR AACRS

December 31, 1979 – December 31, 2019 • Shown as Percent Above/Below Respective Long-Term Median (%)






Starting valuations are a useful guide in setting long-term return expectations

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED PRICE-TO-CASH EARNINGS RATIOS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 5- AND 10-YR AACRS


December 31, 1979 - December 31, 2019

Initial Valuation and Subsequent 5-Yr AACR



Starting Cyclically Adjusted

Initial Valuation and Subsequent 10-Yr AACR




		Starting	Cyclically r	lujusteu		Subsequent Reat				
	P/CE Ratio	Price-to-Cash Earnings Ratio				5-Yr AACR (%)				
	Percentile	Median	High	Low	Media	n High	Low			
ĺ	0-10	2.8	3.6	2.4	15.9	25.4	7.3			
	10-25	5.3	5.9	3.6	13.1	28.9	2.4			
	25-75	7.2	10.1	5.9	7.1	27.9	-5.5			
	75–90	11.6	12.5	10.1	-2.7	10.4	-8.9			
	90-100	14.7	19.2	12.5	-5.4	5.4	-11.3			
	Overall	7.1	19.2	2.4	7.1	28.9	-11.3			

Starting Cyclically Adjusted				Subsequent Real					
Price-to-	Price-to-Cash Earnings Ratio				10-Yr AACR (%)				
Median High Low		Low		Median	High	Low			
2.8	3.6	2.4		10.3	12.7	8.5			
5.3	5.9	3.6		9.8	16.2	5.0			
7.1	10.1	5.9		6.4	15.1	1.4			
11.6	12.5	10.1		1.1	6.9	-2.0			
14.7	19.2	12.5		-2.2	2.5	-4.5			
6.9	19.2	2.4		6.8	16.2	-4.5			

Subsequent Real

Starting normalized valuations are more meaningful as holding periods increase




Dividend yields exhibit positive relationship with subsequent returns, but statistical fit is weak

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDEND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL AACRS


Fourth Quarter 1969 - Fourth Quarter 2019

Dividend Yield and Subsequent 5-YR AACR



Dividend Yield and Subsequent 10-YR AACR

Starting Period




		Sta	Starting Period			Subsequent Real			
Dividend Yield	Divi	dend Yield	(%)		5	-Yr AACR (9	%)		
	Percentile	Median	High	Low		Median	High	Low	
ĺ	0-10	1.7	1.8	1.5		-5.9	-3.1	-10.2	
	10-25	2.6	2.8	2.3		1.1	26.4	-10.1	
	25-75	3.4	4.2	2.8		5.6	28.9	-9.9	
	75–90	4.7	5.4	4.2		0.3	16.7	-5.2	
	90-100	6.0	6.6	5.5		12.3	24.7	-0.3	
	Overall	3.4	6.6	1.5		4.9	28.9	-10.2	


Starting r criou				Subsequent neat				
Dividend Yield (%)			10-Yr AACR (%)					
	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low		
	1.9	2.3	1.5	-1.5	7.5	-4.4		
	2.6	2.8	2.3	4.9	12.8	-1.5		
	3.5	4.2	2.8	5.8	16.2	-5.6		
	4.8	5.4	4.3	8.1	11.1	-4.0		
	6.0	6.6	5.5	10.1	12.7	3.4		
	3.4	6.6	1.5	5.9	16.2	-5.6		

Subsequent Real


Real EPS levels remain below GFC peak; ROE was generally below median in the past decade



Post-GFC low-yield environment has made equities more attractive to bonds




Starting bond yields are an informative guide to subsequent returns




All-time low starting yields imply low subsequent nominal and real returns for bonds

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT 10-YR AACRS

1970-2019 • Percent (%)






	Starting Period				Subsequent Nominal				
Yield	Government Bond Yields				10-Yr AACR (%)				
Quartiles	Mean	High	Low		Mean	High	Low	Std Dev	
First	4.24	5.11	3.16		5.37	6.67	3.95	0.65	
Second	6.84	7.97	5.17		6.97	9.31	5.31	1.05	
Third	8.88	9.94	7.99		8.86	10.91	5.83	1.23	
Fourth	11.90	15.44	10.02		9.49	11.80	7.43	1.07	
Overall	7.97	15.44	3.16		7.67	11.80	3.95	1.92	

Gov	Starting Period Government Bond Yields			Subsequent Real 10-Yr AACR (%)						
Mea	n High	Low	Me	an Hig	gh Low	Std Dev				
4.2	4 5.11	3.16	3.	.56 4.	58 2.18	0.60				
6.8	34 7.97	5.17	3.	.71 6.	33 -2.07	2.35				
8.8	9.94	7.99	3.	.55 6.	94 -2.31	2.79				
11.9	0 15.44	10.02	4.	.54 7.	10 2.37	1.19				
7.9	7 15.44	3.16	3.	84 7.	10 -2.31	1.97				


Higher cash yields associated with higher equity returns historically, but relationship is weak

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TREASURY BILL YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 10-YR EQUITY AACRS


January 31, 1960 – December 31, 2019 • Percent (%)




Current expansion's growth rate has been the weakest since the 1960s



Eurozone yield curve is an unreliable recession indicator



Inflation has stabilized and trended downwards in recent years relative to more volatile history





Contributors to this report include Stuart Brown, Sean Duffin, Gabriel Fontana, Ilona Vdovina, and Graham Landrith.

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