

DECADES OF DATA

GLOBAL MARKETS 1900–2017




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INTRODUCTION

In this edition of Decades of Data, we add yet another year of data to our long-term analysis of valuations and returns. 2017 saw global growth synchronization and economic optimism that supported a risk-on environment during the year. While recent market developments weigh on investors' minds, this report provides a long-term backdrop to develop a framework for evaluating current market conditions. The charts included place current economic conditions, returns, and valuations into historical context.

“Know the history” is a key tenet of our research process, and the insight we have gained from conducting this analysis over many years underpins the long-term investment philosophy at Cambridge Associates.

The analysis presented in this chart book is organized into seven sections:

- Historical returns
- Components of equity returns
- Equity mean reversion
- Equity valuations
- Bond yields, rates, and future returns
- Emerging Markets
- Business cycles

New this year is a section on emerging markets, which outlines 30 years of return history and 20+ years of valuation history. New exhibits in other sections include a look at global growth synchronization, inverted yield curves and recessions, and real earnings per share over time.

Executive Summary

- **Basing investment decisions on the extrapolation of capital market returns from recent, relatively short periods is a common mistake.** Viable conclusions about long-term expected returns cannot be drawn from return data for periods shorter than several decades, and even then, investors should be mindful that long-term statistics are beginning- and end-point sensitive and that returns are more variable than commonly assumed. Still, consideration of shorter time periods within a longer-term context can provide a powerful framework for evaluating current market conditions.
- **After a strong 2016, global equities experienced broad-based gains in 2017.** The US (21.8%), UK (13.1%), and Australia (11.0%) all added another year of healthy returns, while Japan (19.7%) bounced back from a disappointing 2016. Emerging Markets (30.6%) delivered their best gains in eight years. In the US, equities have now posted positive total returns in each of the past nine years, seven of which marked double-digit returns. Since 2009, US equities have seen cumulative total returns of 259% (15.3% annualized). This marks the highest rolling nine-year US equity performance since 2000 (16.1%).
- **The post-global financial crisis period has seen stronger returns than over the very long term in the UK and US, while Australian and Japanese equities have posted returns under their very long-term averages.** For the full period analyzed, investors in US equities (1900–2017) earned a 9.6% nominal average annual compound return (AACR); UK equities (1900–2017), 8.8%; Australian equities (1912–2017), 10.8%; and Japanese equities (1921–2017), 11.3%. Over the past nine years post-crisis, US equities have posted a nominal AACR of 15.3% and UK equities, 11.4%. These returns are well above very long-term averages. Over the most recent ten-year period, which includes the crisis, AACRs are considerably lower, at 8.5% and 6.3%, respectively. For Australian and Japanese equities, the post-crisis and ten-year AACRs are 10.1% and 3.9%, and 10.2% and 3.3%, respectively. This highlights the impact of beginning and end point sensitivity, and reminds investors that even over periods as long as nine or ten years, the “average” is unlikely to be experienced.

Executive Summary (continued)

- **Across regions, equities are most likely to post very long-term annualized returns greater than annual inflation.** Over the full historical period for each country, the return for equities was significantly higher than the AACR for benchmark government bonds (which ranged from 4.6% to 6.6%) and cash (which ranged from 3.8% to 4.8%), and also higher than the rate of inflation. The US has had the lowest level of inflation, averaging 3.0% annually, while the UK has averaged 3.7% annually, and Australia, 4.1%. Japan presents a special case for several reasons. For the full period (1921–2017), inflation has averaged 6.8% annually in Japan, but this includes a period of hyperinflation between 1944 and 1948, when prices rose a cumulative 6,000%. Excluding these years, Japan has averaged annual inflation of 2.5%, just below the US. Japan’s “lost decade” has also had a major impact on equity returns. Since 1990, Japanese equities have returned -0.4% annually, while the US, UK, and Australia have all realized AACRs more in line with their long-term historical averages.
- **Over the long term, equity investors are generally compensated for their risk taking, although regional variations exist.** Since 1900, US equity returns have exceeded bond returns during 77% of all five-year periods, 86% of all ten-year periods, and ~100% of all 25-year periods (calculated on a nominal basis using rolling monthly data). UK equities and bonds show a similar pattern. In Australia, where data begin in 1912, the likelihood of equity outperformance is less over the 25-year time horizon at 82%. Japan, where data begin in 1921, shows the lowest likelihood of equity outperformance in every period, with equities outperforming bonds 73% of the time in rolling monthly 25-year periods. Investors should also be cognizant that equities are subject to larger losses than bonds, particularly over shorter time horizons.
- **The most important factors for total return over time are earnings growth and dividend reinvestment, as the impact of multiple expansion/contraction is negligible given its mean-reverting nature.** Since 1900, two-thirds of US equities’ real total return and more than 90% of UK equities’ real total return has come from reinvesting dividends. Although dividends vary year to year, the compounding of dividends over time is incredibly important (especially during periods of economic decline), as it produces a steady stream of reliable income. For Australian equities, over the period for which we have the requisite component data (1970–2017), dividends contributed nearly the entire total return as price returns were just 10 basis points. In Japan, low dividend yields for most of recent history have made dividends less impactful, accounting for just 36% of total real returns.

Executive Summary (continued)

- **Starting valuations and subsequent equity returns are related, though for shorter periods (one, three, even five years), the relationship is weak.** Normalized valuations and subsequent returns show stronger relationships over longer time periods (e.g., 15-year subsequent returns), but in no case do starting valuations completely explain subsequent returns—many factors can influence equity returns. At December 31 valuations, the average subsequent 15-year real return for US equities has been about 2%; for UK equities, 5%; and for Australian equities, 5%. Emerging markets, while limited in history, also show evidence of this relationship. From December 31 valuations in EM equities, the average subsequent ten-year real return has been about 8%.
- **Given that the presence of relatively high or low valuations alone does not cause markets to reverse course, waiting for valuations to revert to the mean can be an exercise in frustration.** Low valuations provide what famed investment analyst Benjamin Graham called “a margin of safety.” High valuations, on the other hand, provide little room for error, informing the aggressiveness of one’s investment stance. Though the timing and catalysts for change vary, the historical record across regions presented in this report is clear—periods of low valuations have been followed by higher long-term subsequent returns, while periods of high valuations have been followed by poorer long-term returns.
- **Dividend yields on stocks have also shown a relationship to subsequent returns, though not one as strong as valuations.** Across developed regions, higher starting dividend yields have typically been associated with higher subsequent 15-year returns, relative to long-term averages. In emerging markets, there is an unclear relationship between dividend yields and subsequent returns. Dividend yields in the US are currently around the 15th percentile of the historical distribution, where subsequent real 15-year returns are within a range of 3.0% to 7.8%. Dividend yields fail to capture the whole picture, however, as companies can also return excess cash to investors by buying back stock, a strategy which US companies in particular have made great use of in recent years.

Executive Summary (continued)

- **The entry yield is the strongest predictor of subsequent nominal ten-year bond returns**, and with bond yields at or near all-time lows across all four regions, the outlook for future bond returns is decidedly low. While falling yields have been a boon for Australian, UK, and US bond investors for the past 30-plus years, with bonds posting strong returns across all these markets (AACRs of 10.2%, 9.3%, and 8.2%, respectively, since 1981), future returns are likely to be capped. Japan's experience, where bond yields have been below 5% since November 1992, may serve as a guide. Since August 1993, no rolling monthly nominal ten-year return on Japanese bonds has exceeded 5%, and nearly half of these 173 observations have been nominal ten-year returns of less than 2%.
- **Although rising interest rates are popularly regarded as detrimental to equity prices, this is not necessarily so**—the drivers of change in interest rates, rather than their outright levels or the amount of changes in the rates, are what impact equity returns. Stocks can rise amid rising bond yields if such yields reflect improving growth conditions or increasing consumer confidence. The very weak statistical link between short-term interest rates and subsequent five-year returns across all regions reinforces the conclusion that the reason for changes in rates matters more than the absolute level of rates. A closer look at the performance of US equities, US bonds, and cash during historical periods of US Federal Reserve rate hike cycles furthers the conclusion that many other factors influence risk asset performance.
- **The relationship between stock market returns and periods of economic expansion and contraction remains uncertain.** Many investors equate strong economic growth with strong stock performance and vice versa. However, the stock market is effectively a discounting mechanism that moves in anticipation of (though not always ahead of) changes in economic growth and is subject to the whims of investor sentiment and psychology. Extreme valuations are a better predictor of subsequent returns than measures of economic growth.



HISTORICAL RETURNS

Equity, bond, and cash returns can vary dramatically from year to year, but no matter the asset class or the region, the range of returns narrows as the holding period increases. Equities are considered the riskiest of these three asset classes and therefore carry a risk premium, which varies over time and depending on the region. On a rolling three-year basis, average equity outperformance over bonds has ranged from 3.8% (UK) to 5.9% (Japan). Over the long term, equity returns have exceeded those of bonds and cash, though regional differences exist, with US and UK equities most likely to outperform bonds over long time horizons. Over rolling three-year periods, global bonds have outperformed cash by an average margin of between 0.6% (UK) and 2.3% (Japan). However, cash can outperform bonds, particularly during periods of unexpected inflation and rising rates.


Investments become more range bound as holding periods increase

Time increases the probability of earning positive returns, and the range of possible returns narrows as the holding period increases. Equities have the widest range of returns for each period, while cash has the narrowest range. In the US, rolling 50-year periods show a minimum real equity AACR of 4.2%, greater than both the maximum bond (3.1%) and cash (1.8%) AACRs.


RANGE OF EQUITY, BOND, AND CASH RETURNS FOR VARIOUS ROLLING MONTHLY TIME HORIZONS: US

1900–2017 • Average Annual Compound Return (%)

Nominal Returns



Real Returns



■ Equities ■ Bonds ■ Cash


Investments become more range bound as holding periods increase

In the UK, return ranges show similar outcomes to those of US investments. However, real UK equity returns are lower due to higher inflation. Over prolonged time periods, equities prevail; in every rolling 50-year period since 1900, UK equities have outperformed bonds and cash on a real annualized basis.


RANGE OF EQUITY, BOND, AND CASH RETURNS FOR VARIOUS ROLLING MONTHLY TIME HORIZONS: UK

1900–2017 • Average Annual Compound Return (%)

Nominal Returns



Real Returns



■ Equities ■ Bonds ■ Cash


Investments become more range bound as holding periods increase

Top-end nominal equity return ranges for Japan are the highest of all countries in our analysis partly due to occasional periods of extreme inflation. Real equity returns generally show lower troughs than the other countries for the same reason. Over rolling 50-year periods, Japanese equities show the highest maximum range of nominal and real AACRs of the four countries in our analysis. However, Japan is the only country where bonds have occasionally outperformed equities in such long-term periods.


RANGE OF EQUITY, BOND, AND CASH RETURNS FOR VARIOUS ROLLING MONTHLY TIME HORIZONS: JAPAN

1921–2017 • Average Annual Compound Return (%)

Nominal Returns



Real Returns




Investments become more range bound as holding periods increase

Australia is the only country in our analysis where the top one-year equity real return was not higher than bonds, with bonds returning 98% from February 1931 to January 1932. Excluding this outlier or looking at medians, the return trends mimic those of other countries. Like in the US, real rolling 50-year periods show a minimum real equity AACR (4.0%) greater than both the maximum bond (3.8%) and cash (2.4%) AACRs.


RANGE OF EQUITY, BOND, AND CASH RETURNS FOR VARIOUS ROLLING MONTHLY TIME HORIZONS: AUSTRALIA

1912–2017 • Average Annual Compound Return (%)

Nominal Returns



Real Returns



■ Equities ■ Bonds ■ Cash


The equity risk premium is volatile but mean reverting over time

Since 1950, equities have outperformed bonds by an average of ~5% to ~7% annually, depending on the region. This premium is quite volatile, particularly in periods of market stress. In the US and UK, equities have outperformed bonds two-thirds of the time. In Japan and Australia, those figures are slightly lower, at 54% and 59%, respectively.


REALIZED ANNUAL EXCESS RETURNS OF EQUITIES OVER BONDS

1950–2017 • Percent (%)


US




UK



Japan



Australia



— Mean — 1 Standard Deviation

Equities are consistently attractive relative to bonds over the long term

In the US, equities have outperformed bonds over the long term 100% of the time. In the UK, the same strong outperformance occurs, at 94% of the time. Over five- and ten-year time horizons, excess equity returns tend to follow a normal distribution. However, over one-year time horizons, fat tails exist on both the left and right extremes, particularly in the US.


EXCESS RETURNS OF EQUITIES OVER BONDS

1900–2017 • Number of Rolling Monthly Periods

US: 1-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed bonds


65% of the time



5-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed bonds


77% of the time



10-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed bonds


86% of the time



25-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed bonds


100% of the time



UK: 1-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed bonds


66% of the time



5-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed bonds


71% of the time



10-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed bonds


76% of the time



25-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed bonds

94% of the time



Equities are consistently attractive relative to bonds over the long term


Australian equity/bond excess returns have a similar profile to the UK and the US. Excess Japanese equity returns display greater upside and downside over the long term: over rolling monthly 25-year periods, equities underperformed bonds by more than 5 ppts over 5% of time and outperformed bonds by more than 15 ppts over 11% of the time, values not seen in other countries. Similarly, the left- and right-hand tails for one-year excess returns are much larger for Japan than for the other three countries.

EXCESS RETURNS OF EQUITIES OVER BONDS

Number of Rolling Monthly Periods


Japan: 1-Yr Periods
1921-2017

Equities have outperformed bonds
55% of the time




5-Yr Periods
1921-2017

66% of the time




10-Yr Periods
1921-2017

72% of the time




25-Yr Periods
1921-2017

73% of the time




Australia: 1-Yr Periods
1912-2017

Equities have outperformed bonds
64% of the time




5-Yr Periods
1912-2017

69% of the time




10-Yr Periods
1912-2017

76% of the time



25-Yr Periods
1912-2017

82% of the time



Equities are consistently attractive relative to cash over the long term


Excluding three periods in the first decade of the twentieth century, US equity returns have beaten cash in 100% of rolling monthly 25-year periods. In the UK, equity returns have exceeded cash returns in 95% of rolling monthly 25-year periods. This relationship weakens as the time frame shortens—over ten-year windows, US and UK equities outperform cash 82% and 81% of the time, respectively.

EXCESS RETURNS OF EQUITIES OVER CASH

1900–2017 • Number of Rolling Monthly Periods


US: 1-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed cash
67% of the time




5-Yr Periods

75% of the time




10-Yr Periods

82% of the time




25-Yr Periods

100% of the time




UK: 1-Yr Periods

Equities have outperformed cash
60% of the time




5-Yr Periods

69% of the time




10-Yr Periods

81% of the time



25-Yr Periods

95% of the time



Equities are consistently attractive relative to cash over the long term


Australian equity returns have beaten cash in 96% of rolling monthly 25-year periods. In Japan, equity returns have exceeded cash returns in 89% of rolling monthly 25-year periods. Japan again shows a distribution of excess equity returns over cash with greater upside and downside in both long and short time horizons.

EXCESS RETURNS OF EQUITIES OVER CASH

Number of Rolling Monthly Periods


Japan: 1-Yr Periods
1921-2017

Equities have outperformed cash
62% of the time




5-Yr Periods
1921-2017

72% of the time




10-Yr Periods
1921-2017

80% of the time




25-Yr Periods
1921-2017

89% of the time




Australia: 1-Yr Periods
1912-2017

Equities have outperformed cash
70% of the time




5-Yr Periods
1912-2017

81% of the time




10-Yr Periods
1912-2017

88% of the time



25-Yr Periods
1912-2017

96% of the time



Bonds' outperformance of cash varies dramatically by country


In the US, bonds have outperformed cash about two-thirds of the time over 25-year rolling monthly time periods. However, in shorter term periods, this relationship is closer to 50/50. In the UK, the 50/50 relationship holds across various time periods. While cash faces constant inflationary risks, bonds face interest rate risk that can impair their performance relative to cash.

EXCESS RETURNS OF BONDS OVER CASH

1900–2017 • Number of Rolling Monthly Periods


US: 1-Yr Periods

Bonds have outperformed cash
53% of the time




5-Yr Periods

57% of the time




10-Yr Periods

58% of the time




25-Yr Periods

63% of the time




UK: 1-Yr Periods

Bonds have outperformed cash
54% of the time




5-Yr Periods

56% of the time




10-Yr Periods

57% of the time



25-Yr Periods

55% of the time



Bonds' outperformance of cash varies dramatically by country

Japan and Australia show a different experience from the UK and US. In Japan, bonds have outperformed cash in nearly 100% of all 25-year rolling monthly observations. High inflationary periods coupled with paltry cash yields have driven this dispersion. Australian investors have also been compensated for risk over long-term periods, as bonds have outperformed cash 86% of the time over rolling 25-year periods.


EXCESS RETURNS OF BONDS OVER CASH

Number of Rolling Monthly Periods

Japan: 1-Yr Periods

1921-2017


Bonds have outperformed cash
71% of the time



5-Yr Periods

1921-2017


87% of the time



10-Yr Periods

1921-2017


92% of the time



25-Yr Periods

1921-2017


99% of the time



Australia: 1-Yr Periods

1912-2017


Bonds have outperformed cash
64% of the time



5-Yr Periods

1912-2017


73% of the time



10-Yr Periods

1912-2017


78% of the time



25-Yr Periods

1912-2017

86% of the time




Risk assets outperform more frequently in the long run


The benefits of holding equities over bonds and cash are clear in the long run. In the US, equities have outperformed bonds and cash in 100% of rolling 25-year periods since 1900. In other regions, the outperformance is strong, but not a certainty. The relationship between bonds and cash, however, is not as clear. Shifting macroeconomic factors—particularly interest rates and inflation—affect the relative returns of bonds versus cash over time.

RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF EQUITIES, BONDS, AND CASH ACROSS REGIONS
1900–2017


% of Times Equities Outperformed Bonds



% of Times Equities Outperformed Cash



% of Times Bonds Outperformed Cash




Equities are subject to larger drawdowns than bonds


Across countries, the maximum five-year drawdown in bonds is quite mild compared to equities—a range of 0% to -33% versus -1% to -84%. In the US, in 94% of rolling monthly five-year time periods since 1904, equities have experienced a greater drawdown than bonds. Similar patterns exist in Australia, Japan, and the UK, with equities experiencing a greater drawdown in 87%, 95%, and 80% of five-year periods, respectively.

ROLLING MONTHLY 5-YR MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN OF EQUITIES AND BONDS


US
1904–2017




UK
1904–2017



Japan
1925–2017



Australia
1916–2017







— Equities — Bonds

Historically, equities have outperformed bonds by a wide margin

Over rolling three-year periods, global equities have outperformed bonds by an average annualized margin of between 3.8% (UK) and 5.9% (Japan). Compounded over 118 years, a 3.0% margin equates to an equity return 33 times that of bonds. That said, bonds can outperform equities for a sustained period of time. For example, for the 20-year period from 1989 through 2008, bonds outperformed equities on a cumulative basis across all regions.

AACR OF ROLLING MONTHLY 3-YR RETURN DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN EQUITY AND BOND RETURNS

Percent (%)







----- Average

Historically, equities have also outperformed cash by a wide margin

The difference between equity and cash returns is even greater, ranging from an average annualized margin of 4.4% (UK) to 8.1% (Japan). Like bonds, cash can outperform equities, although the timeframes tend to be shorter due to the lower yield (and hence returns) associated with cash versus bonds.

AACR OF ROLLING MONTHLY 3-YR RETURN DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN EQUITY AND CASH RETURNS

Percent (%)







----- Average

Bonds have outperformed cash, but less dramatically

Over rolling three-year periods, bonds have outperformed cash by an average annualized margin of between 0.6% (UK) and 2.3% (Japan). Across regions, bonds have seen periods of pronounced outperformance over the past 30 years as the bond bull market has progressed. However, cash can outperform bonds for sustained periods of time, particularly driven by unexpected inflation and rising rates.

AACR OF ROLLING MONTHLY 3-YR RETURN DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN BOND AND CASH RETURNS

Percent (%)



----- Average



COMPONENTS OF EQUITY RETURNS

The outlook for future equity returns is a function of earnings growth, dividends, and changes in valuations, with the first two the most important over the very long term as the impact of multiple expansion is negligible given its mean-reverting nature. While dividends may vary from year to year, they are the only contributor to returns that is always positive. Thus, the compounding of dividends provides a steady stream of income when compared to the volatile nature of earnings and market cycles. However, as the exhibits in this section demonstrate, some markets have historically been more reliant on dividends for returns than others.


Dividends are an important component of total return

In the US and UK, over one-third to nearly one-half of nominal returns has come from the reinvestment of dividends since 1900. In a number of decades, dividends were the only driver of positive total returns, with price declines seen throughout the ten-year period.


DIVIDEND INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RETURN

1900–2017 • Percent (%)

US



UK




Dividends are an important component of total return

Since 1970, dividends have contributed nearly one-third of the total nominal return of Australian equities. Low dividend yields in Japan have made them less impactful on total Japanese returns. During the 1990s and 2000s, Japanese dividends could not offset the declines seen in equity prices, resulting in negative total returns for those decades.


DIVIDEND INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RETURN

1970–2017 • Percent (%)

Japan




Australia



The compounding of dividends noticeably boosts total returns

Without reinvesting dividends, the S&P 500 would only have returned 2.2% (real) per year since 1900 versus 6.4% when including dividends. In the UK, dividends have had an even more pronounced effect, contributing over 90% of the real AACR of equities.

REAL AVERAGE ANNUAL COMPOUND RETURNS OF EQUITIES
1900–2017 • Percent (%)




The compounding of dividends noticeably boosts total returns

Of the four developed countries we analyzed, only in Japan (where our data begin in 1970) have real price returns outstripped dividend returns. Japanese dividend yields spent a 20-year period—from 1986 to 2005— averaging less than 1.0%. In Australia, cumulative real price returns were insignificant over the last 48 years, with nearly all positive real returns attributable to dividends.

REAL AVERAGE ANNUAL COMPOUND RETURNS OF EQUITIES

1970–2017 • Percent (%)

Japan



Australia




Dividends provide an extra boost during recessions or economic downturns

During periods of economic contraction, earnings generally decline first, preceding any decline in dividends, a reactionary move as companies adjust to diminishing fiscal health. Since 1900, US companies have managed to maintain a net positive average dividend growth rate during recessions, albeit one much lower than that seen during economic expansions.

S&P 500 EARNINGS PER SHARE AND DIVIDENDS PER SHARE YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE

1900–2017 • Percent (%)



Dividends provide an extra boost during recessions or economic downturns


Australia shows a similar pattern to the US, with slightly positive average dividend growth and earnings declines during recessions. UK companies, on the other hand, have seen positive dividend and earnings growth during recessionary periods. However, this is largely skewed by extreme movements during the early 1980s recession in the UK. Excluding that time period, the UK would see a similar pattern to Australia and the US.

EARNINGS PER SHARE AND DIVIDENDS PER SHARE YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE

Percent (%)

UK
1962–2017

Australia
1969–2017



Current dividend yields are in line with more recent history


US and UK dividend yields are 1.0 standard deviation and 0.5 standard deviation below their respective long-term averages. However, their current levels are in line with their more recent 20-year averages. After spending the better part of two decades below 1%, Japanese yields began to rise in the mid-2000s and are now slightly above their long-term average. Outside of a blip in 2008, Australian dividend yields have largely been range bound for the last 20+ years.

TRAILING 12-MONTH DIVIDEND YIELDS

Percent (%)


US

1900–2017




UK

1962–2017




Japan

1969–2017



Australia


1969–2017



Impact of earnings growth and multiple changes less consistent than dividends

Dividends remain the most consistent positive influence on total returns, while the importance of earnings has swung wildly. Although multiple expansion has played a role in driving returns, over the long term the impact becomes negligible as multiple expansion is a mean-reverting time series. In the US, dividends (4.4%) have contributed nearly as much to total annualized returns as earnings growth has (4.8%).


BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL RETURN AACR OVER TIME: US
1900–2017 • Percent (%)



Impact of earnings growth and multiple changes less consistent than dividends

UK dividends have consistently contributed 3.3% to 5.5% of return annually each decade. On average, earnings growth has been the most meaningful contributor to total return for the UK. After the 2015–16 earnings recession, UK earnings bounced back in 2017 and have continued to be the biggest beneficiary to total returns.

BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL RETURN AACR OVER TIME: UK
1963–2017 • Percent (%)




Impact of earnings growth and multiple changes less consistent than dividends

In Australia, dividends and earnings growth have consistently helped deliver positive returns measured over each period. Since 1970, dividends have steadily contributed 2.9% to 3.5% annually of each decade's total return. For the eight years so far this decade, dividends have contributed 4.6%.

BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL RETURN AACR OVER TIME: AUSTRALIA

1970-2017 • Percent (%)




Real earnings tend to retrace prior peaks

In the US and UK, earnings tend to retrace prior peaks before the cycle ends. However, after a prolonged period of depressed earnings in the UK, it remains more than 40% below its pre-financial crisis peaks. The trend is not as clear in Australia, and Japan's volatile earnings history distorts observations over the long term.


REAL EARNINGS PER SHARE OVER TIME

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017 • Cumulative Wealth = 100 on December 31, 1969


US




UK



Japan



Australia




Yield differentials indicate relative risk between stocks and bonds

The spread between the earnings yield and bond yields can be thought of as an equity risk premium, reflecting the market's assessment about the relative risk of equities and bonds. While yield differential models do tend to presage equity outperformance, earnings yields and P/E ratios are better predictors of future stock returns.


NORMALIZED EARNINGS YIELDS VERSUS 10-YR BOND YIELDS

1969-2017


US




UK



JAPAN



AUSTRALIA









EQUITY MEAN REVERSION

Equity returns tend to revert to a long-term average over time, although the process of mean reversion is not smooth and the impact of inflation matters more in some countries than others. Still, across regions, periods of underperformance relative to the mean follow periods of outperformance and vice versa. While this pattern is evident over shorter time horizons, it is much more distinct over long time horizons.

Real returns revert to their long-term averages over time

Rolling returns exhibit the qualities of a mean-reverting time series, though such reversion can be over very short or quite long periods. At the end of 2017, the rolling monthly real ten-year AACR for the US was slightly above its historical average, while real AACRs for the UK, Australia, and Japan were below their historical averages.

ROLLING MONTHLY TOTAL RETURN REAL 10-YR AACR
Percent (%)



— Mean

— 1 Standard Deviation


Mean reversion is not a smooth process

AACRs have remained above and below average for extended periods. At the end of 2017, the nominal ten-year AACR of 8.5% for US equities was just slightly below average, while the real ten-year AACR of 6.8% was slightly above average.


ROLLING MONTHLY TOTAL RETURN 10-YR AACR: US

1909–2017 • Percent (%)

Nominal



Real




Mean reversion is not a smooth process

Means can also shift dramatically over time. Prior to 1982, the average nominal ten-year AACR for UK equities was 7.5%. Since then, the average nominal ten-year AACR has been 12.9%, while the full period average is 9.3%. The nominal ten-year AACR of 6.3% as of 2017 is less than half the average AACR since 1982.


ROLLING MONTHLY TOTAL RETURN 10-YR AACR: UK

1909–2017 • Percent (%)

Nominal



Real




Mean reversion is not a smooth process

Japan's experience with inflation creates more dissonance between its returns in nominal and real terms compared to the other countries in this analysis. And its ten-year nominal AACRs really fall into two distinct periods: an average of 18.2% pre-1970 and an average of 7.2% from 1970 to today. On a real basis the full period average has been just above 4%.

ROLLING MONTHLY TOTAL RETURN 10-YR AACR: JAPAN

1930–2017 • Percent (%)




Mean reversion is not a smooth process

Australia's most recent nominal ten-year AACR is the furthest below average of the four countries in this analysis. At 3.9%, the current value is 1.7 standard deviations below its historical average of 11.0%. Real returns for Australian equities are similarly furthest below average on a standard deviation basis of the four regions.


ROLLING MONTHLY TOTAL RETURN 10-YR AACR: AUSTRALIA

1921–2017 • Percent (%)

Nominal







Real



Periods of poor performance generally followed by better returns and vice versa

The relationship is weak, with US equities showing the strongest relationship at an R^2 of 0.49. However, it is much stronger at the extremes. Across all four countries, periods of double-digit returns are followed by double-digit returns around 2% of the time. At the current values for 15-year real AACRs (between 6% and 8% for the four countries) historical data show a wide range of possible subsequent returns.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROLLING QUARTERLY 15-YR EQUITY REAL AACR AND SUBSEQUENT 15-YR EQUITY REAL AACR



Periods of poor performance generally followed by better returns and vice versa

Current trailing 15-year real AACRs for the US (7.7%) and UK (6.8%) fall within their respective third quartiles, while Japan (6.3%) and Australia (6.3%) both fall within their respective second quartiles. This could imply that US and UK subsequent returns might be below average, while Japan and Australia may be above average, but the range of returns is wide.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROLLING QUARTERLY 15-YR EQUITY REAL AACR AND SUBSEQUENT 15-YR EQUITY REAL AACR

US 1900–2017										UK 1900–2017							
AACR Quartiles	Beginning Period 15-Yr AACR (%)				Subsequent 15-Yr AACR (%)				AACR Quartiles	Beginning Period 15-Yr AACR (%)				Subsequent 15-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev		Mean	High	Low	Std Dev	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	0.60	2.66	-2.67	1.28	10.29	15.49	0.49	2.84	First	-0.71	2.08	-6.51	2.52	8.76	16.44	1.64	3.68
Second	4.41	6.03	2.70	1.03	8.79	15.49	1.09	3.73	Second	3.70	5.14	2.11	0.89	7.76	13.26	2.35	2.83
Third	8.30	10.39	6.05	1.18	6.13	13.97	0.08	3.37	Third	7.16	8.67	5.17	1.04	4.71	10.68	-3.73	3.16
Fourth	12.63	15.49	10.42	1.37	2.52	11.88	-1.76	2.53	Fourth	11.14	16.44	8.70	1.53	3.99	8.32	0.26	2.11
Overall	6.50	15.49	-2.67	4.65	6.92	15.49	-1.76	4.31	Overall	5.34	16.44	-6.51	4.67	6.30	16.44	-3.73	3.60

Japan 1921–2017										Australia 1912–2017							
AACR Quartiles	Beginning Period 15-Yr AACR (%)				Subsequent 15-Yr AACR (%)				AACR Quartiles	Beginning Period 15-Yr AACR (%)				Subsequent 15-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev		Mean	High	Low	Std Dev	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	-9.24	1.64	-20.15	6.07	13.42	25.66	0.90	6.59	First	0.42	3.75	-4.28	2.21	8.53	14.55	3.87	2.61
Second	4.98	6.59	2.01	1.28	3.68	14.63	-6.02	5.28	Second	5.70	7.21	3.87	0.79	4.69	11.90	-1.87	3.22
Third	8.21	10.27	6.60	1.12	-0.33	12.09	-9.89	5.80	Third	8.54	10.07	7.22	0.85	5.01	11.45	-1.44	2.97
Fourth	15.13	25.66	10.30	4.60	1.52	9.82	-17.00	7.73	Fourth	12.28	15.91	10.12	1.60	3.80	11.53	-4.28	4.18
Overall	4.81	25.66	-20.15	9.71	4.56	25.66	-17.00	8.30	Overall	6.75	15.91	-4.28	4.58	5.50	14.55	-4.28	3.75


Market returns: the best and worst case scenarios

One of the interesting uses of historical data is to calculate the degree to which a successful market-timing strategy could have added to achieved returns during particular periods. While it is hard to estimate what an “average” market timer might achieve, the risks are apparent: missing out on some of the best quarters of any market’s performance severely diminishes returns.


CUMULATIVE REAL WEALTH ABSENT THE BEST AND WORST QUARTERS FOR EQUITIES

1900–2017 • January 1, 1900 = 100

US



UK




— Cumulative Real Wealth — Cumulative Real Wealth Absent the Worst Quarters — Cumulative Real Wealth Absent the Best Quarters

Market returns: the best and worst case scenarios

Across all four countries, avoiding the worst two quarters would have improved cumulative returns between two and five fold. At the same time, missing the best two quarters would have reduced cumulative returns by around one-half. These effects quickly compound over successive quarters to the point where 85%+ of cumulative returns are driven by ten or fewer quarters.

CUMULATIVE REAL WEALTH ABSENT THE BEST AND WORST QUARTERS FOR EQUITIES

Index is rebased to 100 at initial time period measured for each region





EQUITY VALUATIONS

Equity valuations, though a mean-reverting series, rarely hover around their averages very long. Valuations can depart from the mean for extended periods of time, seen consistently across the markets we analyzed, and the valuation adjustment can be relatively quick. Given this trending nature, lights flash and sirens wail only at the extremes. The longer unusually high or low valuations persist, the greater the probability investors will be caught off guard when the cycle changes.


We review the historical record of US equity valuations using both S&P and MSCI data. S&P has a much longer history, although this history is a compilation of historical data (as detailed in Notes on the Data) and underlying companies have changed over time, as have accounting standards and the macro environment. When comparing the US with other developed markets regions, we consistently use MSCI data that begin in 1969—nearly five decades of data.

Valuations are lofty in the US and more reasonable globally, but not outright cheap

Valuations are elevated in the US and developed markets as a whole. In the UK, Japan, Australia, and emerging markets, valuations are still in our fairly valued range, but are above their respective medians. US normalized price-earnings ratios, which ended 2017 at 26.5 (91st percentile), have seen extreme levels before (40.4 in December 1999).

NORMALIZED PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS BY REGION


As of December 31, 2017



P/E multiples trend from depressed lows to overvalued peaks

Our longest data set for normalized P/E ratios is the Shiller P/E for the S&P 500, which shows that valuations rarely hover around their historical medians for very long. From 1929 to 1932, the Shiller P/E cratered from 33.0 to 5.2, and from 1999 to 2002 it plunged from 45.2 to 21.0. Slow, grinding de-ratings (1901–20 and 1966–82) are also possible, as are multi-decade run-ups (1982–2000).

S&P 500 NORMALIZED REAL PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS
1880–2017




P/E multiples trend from depressed lows to overvalued peaks

Composite normalized P/E ratios using MSCI indexes allow us to compare similar data across markets. In the US, the longest continual streak in which the composite normalized P/E remained within our fair value range (25th–75th percentile) was for just over eight years, from 1988 to 1996. UK and Australia have both remained in the fair value range for over eight years since bottoming during the global financial crisis. However, given the nature of percentiles, each region will cumulatively spend the same amount of time in the “fair value” category.

COMPOSITE NORMALIZED PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS


US

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017




UK

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017



Australia

January 31, 1971 – December 31, 2017



— Median — 25th/75th Percentile

Sources: MSCI Inc. and Thomson Reuters Datastream. MSCI data provided "as is" without any express or implied warranties.

Notes: The composite normalized price-earnings (P/E) is calculated by dividing the inflation-adjusted index price by the simple average of three normalized earnings metrics: ten-year average real earnings (i.e., Shiller earnings), trend-line earnings, and return on equity-adjusted earnings.


Valuations influence returns over long time horizons

While valuations (and mean reversion) can hold sway on subsequent returns in periods as short as five years, the longer the holding period, the more likely that starting valuations will impact realized real returns. Between five- and 15-year periods for data based on the S&P 500, the R^2 more than doubles from 0.18 to 0.41. The relationship is most apparent at extremely high or low valuations; between extremes many outcomes are possible.


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHILLER PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 5- AND 15-YR AACRS: US

Fourth Quarter 1909 – Fourth Quarter 2017

Initial Valuation and Subsequent 5-Yr AACR



Initial Valuation and Subsequent 15-Yr AACR



P/E Ratio Percentile	Begin Period Shiller US P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 5-Yr AACR (%)			Begin Period Shiller US P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 15-Yr AACR (%)		
	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low
0-10	7.3	8.6	4.8	16.5	32.3	4.0	7.3	8.6	4.8	9.6	14.9	4.9
10-25	9.8	11.0	8.6	10.6	26.3	-8.4	9.8	11.0	8.6	10.4	15.5	0.5
25-75	15.3	21.0	11.0	6.7	25.6	-13.2	14.9	21.0	11.0	6.0	13.8	-0.2
75-90	22.6	25.9	21.1	2.2	23.7	-11.7	22.3	25.9	21.1	0.7	7.7	-1.8
90-100	31.0	45.0	26.1	-2.9	8.3	-13.1	32.8	45.0	26.4	2.2	5.0	-0.6
Overall	14.6	45.0	4.8	7.1	32.3	-13.2	13.7	45.0	4.8	7.2	15.5	-1.8


High normalized P/E ratios typically see very low subsequent 15-year returns

A similar relationship exists using the 48-year history of the MSCI US Index. At the end of 2017, US equity valuations were in the 91st percentile of historical valuations at 26.5 times composite normalized earnings. While five-year real returns from current levels have seen a wide range between -2% and 3%, subsequent 15-year real AACRs have been muted between 2% to 4%.


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPOSITE NORMALIZED PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 5- AND 15-YR AACRS: US

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017

Initial Valuation and Subsequent 5-Yr AACR



Initial Valuation and Subsequent 15-Yr AACR



P/E Ratio Percentile	Begin Period Comp Norm US P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 5-Yr AACR (%)			Begin Period Comp Norm US P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 15-Yr AACR (%)		
	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low
0-10	8.7	9.2	6.6	10.7	23.5	3.2	8.7	9.2	6.6	10.0	14.8	7.6
10-25	10.4	12.2	9.3	4.4	19.9	-5.2	10.3	12.2	9.3	7.6	14.6	4.9
25-75	16.9	22.0	12.3	9.1	26.0	-10.0	16.4	22.0	12.3	6.0	10.2	0.0
75-90	22.7	25.2	22.0	-1.9	7.7	-10.4	23.1	25.2	22.0	2.3	5.0	-0.7
90-100	32.3	40.4	25.3	-4.3	2.9	-7.0	32.3	40.4	25.3	1.7	4.3	1.0
Overall	16.5	40.4	6.6	5.9	26.0	-10.4	15.0	40.4	6.6	6.5	14.8	-0.7


A P/E at the historical median can see below average subsequent 15-year returns

UK equities ended 2017 at a composite normalized P/E ratio of 14.7, close to their historical median. From these levels, UK equities have experienced a wide range of subsequent five-year real returns (-11% to 10%), and 15-year real AACRs, ranging from 2% to 7%.


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPOSITE NORMALIZED PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 5- AND 15-YR AACRS: UK

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017

Initial Valuation and Subsequent 5-Yr AACR



Initial Valuation and Subsequent 15-Yr AACR



P/E Ratio Percentile	Begin Period Comp Norm UK P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 5-Yr AACR (%)			Begin Period Comp Norm UK P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 15-Yr AACR (%)		
	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low
0-10	6.8	7.3	3.8	13.6	28.2	0.2	6.8	7.3	3.8	11.2	14.1	7.6
10-25	8.3	11.1	7.3	9.1	26.0	-3.1	8.1	11.0	7.3	10.4	13.2	6.8
25-75	13.9	16.8	11.1	6.9	16.8	-12.2	14.0	16.8	11.2	5.3	10.5	1.6
75-90	18.1	19.3	16.8	0.9	13.3	-21.5	17.9	19.3	16.8	3.3	5.3	1.0
90-100	22.8	27.1	19.3	-3.3	4.6	-13.8	23.3	27.1	19.5	1.6	3.3	0.9
Overall	13.9	27.1	3.8	6.1	28.2	-21.5	13.8	27.1	3.8	5.8	14.1	0.9


When P/Es fall within the fairly valued band, the range of outcomes can be wide

Australian equities were fairly valued at year end, with the composite normalized P/E of 17.6 in the 67th percentile of historical observations. From this level subsequent five-year real returns have ranged from 3% to 16%, while subsequent 15-year real AACRs have been in a narrower range of 4% to 7%.


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPOSITE NORMALIZED PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 5- AND 15-YR AACRS: AUSTRALIA

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017

Initial Valuation and Subsequent 5-Yr AACR



Initial Valuation and Subsequent 15-Yr AACR




P/E Ratio Percentile	Begin Period Comp Norm Australia P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 5-Yr AACR (%)			Begin Period Comp Norm Australia P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 15-Yr AACR (%)		
	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low
0-10	8.8	9.5	7.2	9.4	30.2	0.3	8.8	9.5	7.2	8.5	11.0	6.9
10-25	10.9	13.0	9.5	8.8	15.6	-0.2	10.9	13.0	9.5	8.0	10.4	4.9
25-75	15.7	18.6	13.0	6.5	17.6	-8.6	15.4	18.6	13.0	5.3	9.3	2.7
75-90	20.7	22.7	18.6	3.3	14.3	-14.3	20.5	22.7	18.7	4.5	5.3	1.2
90-100	25.4	35.4	22.8	-6.4	4.4	-21.6	25.9	35.4	22.8	0.0	4.1	-4.1
Overall	15.7	35.4	7.2	5.7	30.2	-21.6	14.4	35.4	7.2	5.7	11.0	-4.1

Higher starting P/E ratios indicate lower subsequent returns

Historically, normalized P/E ratios above their long-term median have typically led to below median subsequent ten-year returns; normalized P/E ratios below the long-term median have been associated with above median subsequent ten-year returns. If history is any guide, elevated valuations in the US in recent years may mean ten-year returns from this starting point will fall below median levels.

US SHILLER PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 10-YR AACRS

First Quarter 1926 – Fourth Quarter 2017 • Shown as Percent Above/Below Respective Long-Term Median (%)




Higher starting P/E ratios indicate lower subsequent returns

Normalized valuations for UK and Australian equities have also been fairly reliable counter-indicators of future return trends. Based on their nearly median-level current valuations, investors may infer a higher likelihood of achieving real returns around the historical median level over the coming decade.


COMPOSITE NORMALIZED PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 10-YR AACRS

Fourth Quarter 1969 – Fourth Quarter 2017 • Shown as Percent (%) Above/Below Respective Long-Term Median

UK



Australia



Sources: MSCI Inc. and Thomson Reuters Datastream. MSCI data provided "as is" without any express or implied warranties.

Notes: Graph shows percent above/below median for returns and valuations. Line shows point-in-time composite normalized real price-earnings (P/E) ratios. Bars are based on quarterly data and show subsequent rolling ten-year real average annual compound returns (AACRs) as a percentage above/below the long-term median ten-year real return of each region of 5.3% and 5.5% for Australia and the UK, respectively. For example, the first data point shows that the real AACR for the period 1970–79 was 222.4% below the median ten-year real return for Australia and was 197.7% below the median ten-year real return for the UK.


Valuations, normalized and trailing, are not a good guide to short term returns

For investors with a short-term (one-year) time horizon, starting valuations provide little guidance for future returns. High and low starting valuations are not universally disastrous nor advantageous in the short run, as investors have seen positive subsequent returns from the highest starting composite normalized P/E ratio decile and negative returns from the lowest decile. The wide return dispersion serves a reminder that valuations are a poor guide to subsequent short-term returns.


RANGE OF SUBSEQUENT 1-YR REAL RETURNS: US, UK, AND AUSTRALIA

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017 • Percent (%)

Starting Composite Normalized P/E Ratio



Starting Trailing P/E Ratio




Over longer periods, elevated valuations portend lower returns (and vice versa)

The longer the holding period, the more certain that starting normalized valuations will impact realized real returns. In the US, the composite normalized P/E ratio of 26.5 at December 31 lies in the 10th decile of historical observations. From this decile, the median subsequent 15-year real AACR is just 2%, with a max of 4%.

DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSEQUENT REAL RETURNS FROM STARTING COMPOSITE NORMALIZED P/E DECILES: US

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017 • Subsequent Real Return AACR (%)




Over longer periods, elevated valuations portend lower returns (and vice versa)

In the UK, the current composite normalized P/E ratio of 14.7 lies in the 7th decile of historical observations. From this decile, the median subsequent 15-year real AACR is about 4%.

DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSEQUENT REAL RETURNS FROM STARTING COMPOSITE NORMALIZED P/E DECILES: UK

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017 • Subsequent Real Return AACR (%)




Over longer periods, elevated valuations portend lower returns (and vice versa)

In Australia, the current composite normalized P/E ratio of 17.6 sits in the 7th decile of historical observations. From this decile, the median subsequent real 15-year AACR has delivered mid-single-digit returns.

DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSEQUENT REAL RETURNS FROM STARTING COMPOSITE NORMALIZED P/E DECILES: AUSTRALIA

December 31, 1969 – December 31, 2017 • Subsequent Real Return AACR (%)




Sources: MSCI Inc. and Thomson Reuters Datastream. MSCI data provided "as is" without and express or implied warranties.

Note: The composite normalized price-earnings (P/E) is calculated by dividing the inflation-adjusted index price by the simple average of three normalized earnings metrics: ten-year average real earnings (i.e., Shiller earnings), trend-line earnings, and return on equity-adjusted earnings.

Dividend yields can be a useful indicator of subsequent equity returns

Dividend yields also have a relationship with subsequent returns. In the US, the top decile of dividend yields has been associated with subsequent 15-year real returns well above average. This is not so in the UK, where even periods of high dividend yields have seen poor subsequent returns, and where the relationship between dividend yields and returns is slightly weaker. At 1.8%, the current US dividend yield is quite low relative to history and associated with modest subsequent returns.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDEND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 15-YR AACRS



Dividend Yield Percentile	Begin Period US Dividend Yield (%)			Subsequent Real 15-Yr AACR (%)			Begin Period UK Dividend Yield (%)			Subsequent Real 15-Yr AACR (%)		
	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low
0-10	1.4	1.7	1.1	2.3	6.1	1.8	2.4	2.9	2.1	2.2	4.5	1.4
10-25	2.0	2.0	1.8	5.6	7.8	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.0	4.5	6.7	0.9
25-75	3.1	3.9	2.1	4.0	12.5	-1.8	4.2	4.9	3.4	5.4	12.8	0.9
75-90	4.5	5.2	3.9	9.3	15.5	4.1	5.4	5.8	4.9	8.3	13.6	1.1
90-100	5.8	7.4	5.2	11.9	14.9	9.5	6.3	11.7	5.8	12.1	16.4	1.8
Overall	3.4	7.4	1.1	6.1	15.5	-1.8	4.3	11.7	2.1	5.4	16.4	0.9


Dividend yields can be a useful indicator of subsequent equity returns

Japanese dividend yields show the highest correlation with subsequent returns, with an R^2 of 0.63, likely due to the very narrow range for Japanese dividend yields. Japan's current dividend yield of 1.9% is in the 66th percentile of its historical observations, while Australia's current dividend yield of 4.3% is in the 61st percentile.


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDEND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 15-YR AACRS

Fourth Quarter 1969 – Fourth Quarter 2017

Japan



Australia



Dividend Yield Percentile	Begin Period			Subsequent Real			Begin Period			Subsequent Real		
	Japan Dividend Yield (%)			15-Yr AACR (%)			Australia Dividend Yield (%)			15-Yr AACR (%)		
	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low
0-10	0.5	0.7	0.4	-4.5	1.4	-6.4	2.9	3.0	1.8	2.7	5.3	-4.2
10-25	0.8	0.8	0.7	-1.7	2.4	-3.7	3.2	3.5	3.0	4.5	7.3	0.8
25-75	1.1	2.0	0.9	3.9	8.5	-2.4	4.0	4.7	3.6	6.2	10.0	2.6
75-90	2.3	2.6	2.1	8.9	12.1	6.8	5.0	5.3	4.8	8.2	10.7	5.0
90-100	4.0	5.2	2.7	9.4	14.6	6.5	5.8	9.2	5.4	8.0	10.9	5.8
Overall	1.0	5.2	0.4	3.0	14.6	-6.4	3.9	9.2	1.8	5.8	10.9	-4.2

Upside from current valuations varies by region

Combining many of the factors discussed throughout this report, we can do some simple modeling to estimate future return outcomes. Holding dividends and payout ratio assumptions constant—and reverting today’s valuations to terminal levels given specific earnings growth assumptions—the range of outcomes is wide. In the US, elevated starting valuations indicate the potential for increased downside risk if valuations revert to median at the end of ten years and earnings growth is average. UK, Australia, and Japan show better potential returns from today’s valuations.

REAL RETURN EXPECTATIONS GIVEN VARIOUS EARNINGS GROWTH AND ENDING NORMALIZED P/E ASSUMPTIONS

As of December 31, 2017 • 10-Yr Average Annual Compound Return Expectations (%)

US

Ending Comp	Norm P/E	Annualized Real Earnings Growth (%)			
		-2.0	0.0	2.0	4.0
10th %ile	9.3	-9.4	-7.6	-5.8	-4.0
25th %ile	12.3	-7.2	-5.3	-3.5	-1.6
Median	17.3	-4.2	-2.3	-0.4	1.5
75th %ile	22.0	-2.1	-0.1	1.8	3.8
90th %ile	25.2	-0.9	1.1	3.1	5.1

UK

Ending Comp	Norm P/E	Annualized Real Earnings Growth (%)			
		-2.0	0.0	2.0	4.0
10th %ile	7.3	-3.9	-1.9	0.0	1.9
25th %ile	11.1	-0.7	1.2	3.2	5.2
Median	13.9	1.1	3.1	5.1	7.1
75th %ile	16.8	2.7	4.7	6.7	8.8
90th %ile	19.3	3.9	5.9	8.0	10.1

Japan

Ending Comp	Norm P/E	Annualized Real Earnings Growth (%)			
		-2.0	0.0	2.0	4.0
10th %ile	12.8	-3.0	-1.0	0.9	2.8
25th %ile	14.7	-1.8	0.2	2.1	4.1
Median	16.8	-0.6	1.4	3.3	5.3
75th %ile	20.4	1.1	3.1	5.2	7.2
90th %ile	24.3	2.8	4.8	6.8	8.9

Australia

Ending Comp	Norm P/E	Annualized Real Earnings Growth (%)			
		-2.0	0.0	2.0	4.0
10th %ile	9.5	-3.9	-2.0	-0.1	1.8
25th %ile	13.0	-1.3	0.6	2.6	4.6
Median	16.0	0.3	2.3	4.3	6.3
75th %ile	18.6	1.7	3.7	5.7	7.7
90th %ile	22.8	3.4	5.5	7.5	9.6

 Negative  5% or Higher



BOND YIELDS, RATES, AND FUTURE RETURNS





History and basic bond math have shown that the entry yield of a bond or portfolio of bonds is likely to be the overwhelming determinant of future returns. Given today's low-yield environment—in some cases record low yield—the outlook for future bond returns is muted at best. Japan's experience, where bond yields have been below 5% since November 1992, may serve as a guide. Since August 1993, no rolling monthly nominal ten-year return on Japanese bonds has exceeded 5%, and nearly half of these 173 observations have been nominal ten-year returns of less than 2%.

Subsequent bond returns largely track the starting yield

Historically, current bond yields have been a very good predictor of future returns, with correlations near 90% and higher for the US, UK, and Australia. In Japan, the correlation is only slightly weaker at 83%. With current yields at or near all-time lows, the outlook for future bond returns is decidedly low.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT 10-YR AACRS

Percent (%) • 1900–2017





— Yield — 10-Yr Subsequent AACR

Initial bond yields are strongly correlated to subsequent nominal returns

Initial yields and subsequent nominal ten-year returns on US government bonds have an R^2 of 0.89. This is largely due to the effect of rising bond prices offsetting lower interest payments during periods of falling yields and vice versa. While inflation weakens this relationship, initial yields are still a decent predictor of real returns over time.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT 10-YR AACRS: US

1900–2017 • Percent (%)



Yield Quartiles	Beginning Period Government Bond Yields			Subsequent Nominal 10-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	2.43	3.01	1.57	1.95	3.92	0.37	0.87
Second	3.47	3.92	3.01	3.38	5.55	1.47	1.13
Third	4.76	6.12	3.92	4.95	7.60	2.22	1.26
Fourth	8.59	15.84	6.12	9.27	15.82	3.86	2.74
Overall	4.81	15.84	1.57	4.89	15.82	0.37	3.21



Yield Quartiles	Beginning Period Government Bond Yields			Subsequent Real 10-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	2.43	3.01	1.57	-1.09	1.16	-4.14	1.51
Second	3.47	3.92	3.01	0.84	7.15	-6.26	3.69
Third	4.76	6.12	3.92	2.72	8.93	-5.65	3.31
Fourth	8.59	15.84	6.12	4.40	11.43	-4.46	3.64
Overall	4.81	15.84	1.57	1.72	11.43	-6.26	3.77

Initial bond yields are strongly correlated to subsequent nominal returns

UK bond yields have been a strong predictor of future nominal ten-year returns, but less so for real returns. With the year-end nominal yield of 1.2% not far from the all-time low, future returns for UK bonds are highly likely to be below historical averages.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT 10-YR AACRS: UK

1958–2017 • Percent (%)



Yield Quartiles	Beginning Period Government Bond Yields			Subsequent Nominal 10-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	4.94	5.63	4.14	4.89	7.08	0.57	1.93
Second	6.82	8.35	5.69	5.02	9.53	-0.66	2.93
Third	9.65	10.77	8.43	10.94	14.03	7.89	1.56
Fourth	12.92	17.24	10.83	14.08	18.72	11.76	1.74
Overall	8.58	17.24	4.14	8.73	18.72	-0.66	4.47



Yield Quartiles	Beginning Period Government Bond Yields			Subsequent Real 10-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	4.94	5.63	4.14	1.95	4.27	-4.64	2.55
Second	6.82	8.35	5.69	-0.87	6.77	-7.42	4.97
Third	9.65	10.77	8.43	3.76	9.19	-5.35	5.14
Fourth	12.92	17.24	10.83	6.34	9.84	0.54	1.81
Overall	8.58	17.24	4.14	2.79	9.84	-7.42	4.69

Initial bond yields are strongly correlated to subsequent nominal returns

While still high at 0.75, the R^2 of Japanese nominal bond yields to subsequent nominal ten-year returns is lower than that for the other countries in our analysis. On a real basis, the R^2 came out at a low 0.12. Japan's triple-digit annual inflation in the years following World War II pushed real returns into deep negative territory. Nonetheless, even stripping out these particular returns results in a weaker relationship than that seen in the other countries.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT 10-YR AACRS: JAPAN

1921–2017 • Percent (%)



Yield Quartiles	Beginning Period Government Bond Yields			Subsequent Nominal 10-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	2.58	3.82	0.71	3.51	8.83	0.84	1.99
Second	4.86	5.59	3.82	5.76	11.18	2.43	2.18
Third	6.45	7.21	5.59	7.67	11.14	5.23	1.13
Fourth	8.82	14.82	7.21	9.43	13.04	6.58	1.58
Overall	5.68	14.82	0.71	6.59	13.04	0.84	2.82



Yield Quartiles	Beginning Period Government Bond Yields			Subsequent Real 10-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	2.58	3.82	0.71	-8.18	4.75	-33.72	14.96
Second	4.86	5.59	3.82	-3.27	7.59	-34.34	13.18
Third	6.45	7.21	5.59	5.70	15.04	-2.61	5.05
Fourth	8.82	14.82	7.21	4.50	7.64	-1.78	2.87
Overall	5.68	14.82	0.71	-0.31	15.04	-34.34	11.81

Initial bond yields are strongly correlated to subsequent nominal returns

Bond yields and nominal ten-year returns showed the highest R^2 for Australia at 0.92. This fell to 0.40 on a real return basis, but was still the highest of the four regions examined. With Australian government bonds yielding just 2.64%, future returns are likely to be sub-par.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT 10-YR AACRS: AUSTRALIA

1912–2017 • Percent (%)



Yield Quartiles	Beginning Period Government Bond Yields			Subsequent Nominal 10-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	3.49	4.24	3.02	3.92	6.12	2.15	1.28
Second	4.82	5.10	4.26	5.42	7.20	3.53	1.00
Third	5.73	6.96	5.10	6.30	10.39	1.98	1.38
Fourth	11.15	16.40	7.05	12.45	18.68	6.49	3.00
Overall	6.30	16.40	3.02	7.02	18.68	1.98	3.73


Yield Quartiles	Beginning Period Government Bond Yields			Subsequent Real 10-Yr AACR (%)			
	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High	Low	Std Dev
First	3.49	4.24	3.02	-1.37	3.37	-6.27	3.12
Second	4.82	5.10	4.26	3.47	8.83	-3.41	3.39
Third	5.73	6.96	5.10	2.34	9.53	-5.67	4.13
Fourth	11.15	16.40	7.05	6.79	12.25	-3.00	4.02
Overall	6.30	16.40	3.02	2.81	12.25	-6.27	4.69

Global policy rates in recent years have been uncommonly low

Since peaking in the early 1980s, policy rates have trended downward to near zero in several regions. Policy rates for Australia, Japan, and the UK remained at unprecedented lows in 2017. The US, after maintaining its lowest policy rate on record for seven years, hiked rates by 25 bps at the end of 2015, 25 bps at the end of 2016, and three times for a total of 75 bps in 2017. Still, rates across these markets remain far below average, and monetary policy, which has moved in sync in recent years, has started to diverge.

GLOBAL POLICY RATES

January 31, 1900 – December 31, 2017 • Percent (%)



Sources: Global Financial Data, Inc. and Thomson Reuters Datastream.


No meaningful relationship between absolute interest rates and equity returns

The very weak relationship between short-term rates and subsequent five-year returns shows that the level of rates has little impact. The observed R^2 ranges from 0.01 (US) to 0.11 (UK and Japan). Stock valuations and stocks themselves can rise amid rising bond yields if such yields reflect improved growth conditions, or increasing consumer confidence. As such, interest rates themselves have a less clear impact on equities than the factors driving the changes in yields.


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TREASURY BILL YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 5-YR EQUITY AACRS

January 31, 1960 – December 31, 2017 • Percent (%)


US




UK



Japan



Australia



The rate of change in interest rates also gives no meaningful signal

Starting with the rate hikes that began in December 2015, the Fed has now raised its policy rate by 125 bps over 25 months, after seven years of holding a 25 bp target rate. Looking at historical periods of Fed rate hikes of at least 100 bps provides no clear guidance as to whether equities, bonds, or cash will perform best. The direction of rates is not the only thing that determines risk asset performance; many other factors influence returns.

BOND & EQUITY RETURNS DURING PERIODS WHEN TARGET FED FUNDS RATE INCREASED BY 100 BPS OR MORE

As of December 31, 2017

Period of ≥ 100 bps Target Fed Rate Increase		Months	Target Fed Funds Rate Change (bps)	Cumulative Return (%)		
				T-Bills	10-Yr Govt Bonds	S&P 500
7/1/1971	to 10/31/1971	4	150	1.60	8.57	-4.55
3/1/1972	to 6/30/1974	28	700	16.35	4.27	-13.20
8/1/1977	to 3/31/1980	32	1,175	24.97	-8.66	18.39
10/1/1980	to 2/28/1981	5	650	5.70	-3.54	6.60
5/1/1981	to 6/30/1981	2	350	2.64	3.68	-0.43
2/1/1982	to 4/30/1982	3	200	3.49	5.06	-1.74
3/1/1984	to 8/31/1984	6	206	5.40	2.30	8.87
3/1/1988	to 5/31/1989	15	331	9.80	8.64	25.32
2/1/1994	to 6/30/1995	17	300	7.03	6.51	17.80
6/1/1999	to 12/31/2000	19	175	9.32	14.31	3.33
6/1/2004	to 8/31/2007	39	425	12.89	16.96	39.65
12/1/2015	to Present	25	125	1.22	2.66	34.25



EMERGING MARKETS

Emerging markets returns have limited observable history, but show similar equity return patterns relative to developed markets. Like developed markets, in emerging markets the range of returns narrows as the holding period increases. However, emerging markets have experienced more volatile performance and have suffered from greater drawdowns historically. Emerging markets show evidence of mean reversion over time, both in absolute terms and relative to developed markets. Starting valuations in emerging markets have shown an inverse relationship with subsequent returns over mid-term periods.


Using MSCI data, we compare emerging markets to developed markets in USD terms—covering 30 years of return history. Valuation history is more limited with 22 years of historical observations. To assess the relationship of starting valuations and subsequent returns, we use local currency returns.

The emerging markets investment landscape continues to evolve


Emerging markets, which now represent 12% of the global equity market, are led by weights in China (30%), South Korea (15%), and Taiwan (11%). The MSCI Emerging Markets Index has rapidly evolved over time. Latin America's weight in the index has had a weaker influence, as the index has seen substantial growth in Asian market capitalization. Just a decade ago, China held only a 16% weight in the index, nearly half of its size today. Since 1988, three countries have joined the index, two have been promoted to developed markets, and five have dropped out of the index.

GEOGRAPHIC EXPOSURES OVER TIME: EMERGING MARKETS


1988 – 2017 • Percent (%)




EM Asia



EM Europe, Middle East, and Africa



EM Latin America



Investments become more range bound as holding periods increase

Emerging markets show a wider range of outcomes than developed markets over all holding periods. As the holding period increases, the range tightens.


RANGE OF EQUITY RETURNS FOR VARIOUS ROLLING MONTHLY TIME HORIZONS: EM VS DM

1987–2017 • Average Annual Compound Return (%) • US Dollar

Nominal Returns



Real Returns



Annual returns in emerging markets are more volatile than developed markets

The distribution of annual returns in emerging markets highlights the volatility relative to developed markets. However, emerging markets returns have exceeded 50% in six different years since 1988. A strong 2017 for emerging markets equity returns (37.3%) trounced developed markets (22.4%).


DISTRIBUTION OF CALENDAR YEAR RETURNS

1988–2017 • US Dollar

Emerging Markets

Positive Years: 57%


Negative Years: 43%



Developed Markets

Positive Years: 73%

Negative Years: 27%




Emerging markets tend to experience larger drawdowns than developed markets

Over five-year periods, emerging markets can see significant drawdowns relative to developed markets. The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and the 2008-2009 global financial crisis had pronounced impact on emerging markets equity drawdowns.

ROLLING MONTHLY 5-YR MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN OF EQUITIES: EM VS DM

1992-2017 • Percent (%) • US Dollar



Earnings growth has provided a similar boost to returns in DM and EM

Since 1996, earnings growth has provided around a 5% annual contribution to total returns in both emerging and developed markets. Dividend growth offered a better boost to EM total returns, while multiple compression detracted from annual gains.

BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL RETURN AACR OVER TIME

1996–2017 • Percent (%) • US Dollar




Mean reversion is not a smooth process

At the end of 2017, nominal and real five-year rolling AACRs were 4.3% and 2.9%, respectively, in emerging markets, about 55% below their respective long-term averages.


ROLLING MONTHLY TOTAL RETURN 5-YR AACR: EM

1992–2017 • Percent (%) • US Dollar

Nominal



Real




Emerging markets have shown mean reversion versus developed markets

Emerging markets experienced a sustained drawdown relative to developed markets after the global financial crisis. In the five years ending in 2015, developed markets outperformed emerging markets by nearly 70 percentage points (ppts). However, over the past two years, emerging markets have outperformed developed markets by over 20 ppts. While history is limited, the relative returns between emerging and developed markets show visual evidence of mean reversion.

RELATIVE PERFORMANCE: EM VS DM

December 31, 1987 – December 31, 2017 • US Dollar




Valuations influence returns over long time horizons

In emerging markets, initial valuations provide no indication of subsequent short term returns, with an R^2 of just 0.17 during five-year periods. Over ten-year periods, the relationship shows a much higher R^2 of 0.72. However, it should be noted that all normalized P/E ratios in the top percentile occurred during the 2006-2007 lead up to the global financial crisis.


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROE-ADJUSTED PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 5- AND 10-YR AACRS: EM

September 30, 1995 – December 31, 2017 • Returns in Local Currency

Initial Valuation and Subsequent 5-Yr AACR



Initial Valuation and Subsequent 10-Yr AACR



P/E Ratio Percentile	Begin Period EM ROE-Adjusted P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 5-Yr AACR (%)			Begin Period EM ROE-Adjusted P/E Ratio			Subsequent Real 10-Yr AACR (%)		
	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low
0-10	11.3	12.0	8.0	10.2	27.6	-2.3	10.7	11.9	8.0	10.7	13.0	5.5
10-25	12.6	13.1	12.1	9.5	28.5	-4.3	12.6	13.1	12.1	9.8	11.9	5.3
25-75	14.8	16.9	13.1	4.7	24.0	-6.3	14.9	16.9	13.1	7.8	11.0	5.7
75-90	17.8	19.6	16.9	2.8	9.5	-2.7	18.2	19.6	16.9	5.4	7.4	2.1
90-100	21.9	26.0	19.6	-0.5	7.5	-5.1	21.9	26.0	19.6	1.4	2.5	0.3
Overall	15.3	26.0	8.0	3.6	28.5	-6.3	15.1	26.0	8.0	7.2	13.0	0.3

Sources: MSCI Inc. and Thomson Reuters Datastream. MSCI data provided "as is" without any express or implied warranties.

Notes: Data are monthly. The return on equity (ROE)-adjusted price-earnings (P/E) is calculated by multiplying the current P/E ratio by the ratio of current ROE to long-term median ROE. The last full five-year period was January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2017, and the last full 10-year period was January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2017. Total return data prior to January 1, 2001 is gross of dividend taxes. From January 1, 2001 to present total return data is net of dividend taxes. Data are in local currency terms. In USD terms, the R^2 are lower with 5-yr=0.07 and 10-yr=0.52.


Dividend yields do not have a clear relationship to subsequent returns in emerging markets

For the 22 year history of dividend yields examined, the relationship between starting yields and subsequent returns is unclear. However, since 2008, the relationship between starting dividend yields and five-year subsequent returns has been tighter.


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDEND YIELDS AND SUBSEQUENT REAL 5- AND 10-YR AACRS: EM

September 30, 1995 – December 31, 2017 • Returns in Local Currency

5-Yr



10-Yr



Dividend Yield Percentile	Begin Period Dividend Yield (%)			Subsequent Real 5-Yr AACR (%)			Begin Period Dividend Yield (%)			Subsequent Real 10-Yr AACR (%)		
	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low	Median	High	Low
0-10	1.8	2.0	1.5	1.5	12.9	-6.3	1.8	2.0	1.5	6.8	9.7	0.3
10-25	2.1	2.1	2.0	-1.6	17.0	-5.8	2.1	2.1	2.0	7.0	10.8	0.7
25-75	2.4	2.7	2.1	5.0	28.5	-2.8	2.4	2.7	2.1	7.1	11.9	1.0
75-90	2.8	2.9	2.7	5.9	26.1	1.4	2.8	2.9	2.7	7.9	11.5	4.1
90-100	3.2	4.3	3.0	9.4	25.6	2.7	3.1	3.9	3.0	10.5	13.0	6.2
Overall	2.3	4.3	1.5	3.6	28.5	-6.3	2.3	3.9	1.5	7.2	13.0	0.3



BUSINESS CYCLES

Investors never really know in real time whether the economy has entered an “official” recession, as it is not uncommon for the institutions responsible for giving the official decree to designate the beginning or end of a recession well after the recession has come and gone.* For example, in the last US recession, the National Bureau of Economic Research announced in December 2008 that the US was in a recession, but it marked the beginning of the downturn as December 2007.

In the US, since the end of World War II, the average business cycle (expansion and contraction) has lasted just less than six years, but cycles have varied greatly in duration and intensity. This is even more true in other regions. While many investors assume periods of strong economic growth provide attractive investment opportunities, economic growth and equity returns are uncorrelated. And while it is typical for a recession to be accompanied by a sharp sell-off in equities, equities do not always turn down once earnings growth slows, nor is every downturn in earnings the result of economic weakness.


* A common definition for a recession is two or more quarters of declining real GDP. However, GDP is not the only factor used by major economic research organizations when identifying recessions. For instance, the US experienced a recession in 2001, even without experiencing two consecutive quarters of declining real GDP.

Global growth synchronization is an uncommon occurrence

For the first time since before the global financial crisis, none of 47 countries in the MSCI Developed and Emerging Market indexes contracted in 2017 based on annual data. In terms of recessions, data from the Economic Cycle Research Institute show that none of the top ten contributors to global GDP growth experienced recession in 2017. These conditions have signaled a supportive environment for risk assets.


PERCENT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIES EXPANDING VS CONTRACTING ANNUALLY

1981–2017



NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN RECESSION

1969–2017 • Top 10 Contributors to Global GDP Growth in 2017



Sources: Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), FactSet Research Systems, International Monetary Fund - World Economic Outlooks Database (October 2017), and MSCI Inc. MSCI data provided "as is" without any express or implied warranties.


Notes: In the top chart, global growth analysis are based on year-over-year real GDP growth in local currency terms. Included in the global growth analysis are the 23 developed markets economies in the MSCI World Index and the 24 emerging markets economies in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. Growth for 2017 are forecasts. Bottom chart dates represent peak-to-trough business cycles as defined by the ECRI. Analysis includes top ten current contributors to global GDP: the US, China, Japan, Germany, the UK, France, India, Brazil, Italy, and Canada. Brazil data start January 1981, and China starts January 1984.

Steady economic growth has kept recession risk low in recent years

According to NBER data, the US is currently in the third longest expansion on record (102 months). History would suggest that the odds of continued economic expansion are diminishing, but continued expansion would not be unprecedented—cycles do not die of old age. This is clearly shown in Australia, which has not experienced a recession in 25+ years.


US GDP

1947–2017 • Quarter-Over-Quarter (%)




UK GDP

1955–2017 • Quarter-Over-Quarter (%)




Japan GDP

1960–2017 • Quarter-Over-Quarter (%)



Australia GDP

1960–2017 • Quarter-Over-Quarter (%)




GDP growth and equity returns have little relationship

Comparing data from four developed markets over nearly 50 years, measuring ten-year annualized GDP growth and comparing that to subsequent ten-year real equity AACRs shows no meaningful relationship. Valuations are a better guide, with extreme lows and extreme highs the best indicators of what subsequent returns will look like.

RELATIONSHIP OF EQUITY RETURNS WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH AND VALUATION: DM

Fourth Quarter 1969 – Fourth Quarter 2017 • Local Currency • Percent (%)




GDP growth and equity returns have little relationship

Emerging markets show a similar outcome to developed markets, with little evidence of a relationship between economic growth and equity performance. While there have been 10-year periods of accelerated growth in EM -- in some cases in excess of 10%-- subsequent equity returns have not always moved in the same direction.

RELATIONSHIP OF EQUITY RETURNS WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH AND VALUATION: EM

Third Quarter 1994 – Fourth Quarter 2017 • Percent (%) • Local Currency




Yield curve inversion can signal trouble

In the US, the yield curve has inverted before every recession in the past 50 years, based on the 10-year/3-month yield spread. Outside of the US, the yield curve inversion also gives meaningful signals for Australia and UK recessionary environments. Curves have flattened over the past few years, but flattening alone does not signal imminent recession.


10-YR/3-MONTH YIELD SPREAD

1940–2017 • Percent (%)


US




UK



Japan



Australia




Inflation has stabilized at very low levels in recent decades

Across developed regions, inflation is very low by historical standards. On a year-over-year basis, inflation has been trending downward since the 1970s and ten-year moving averages have stabilized at low levels since 2000. Over the past five years, Australia, Japan, and the US have seen the lowest annualized price increases in half a century.

INFLATION


US

1900–2017 • Yr-Over-Yr (%)




UK

1900–2017 • Yr-Over-Yr (%)




Japan

1922–2017 • Yr-Over-Yr (%)



Australia

1912–2017 • Yr-Over-Yr (%)



■ Inflation
 ■ Deflation
 — 10-Yr Moving Average

Notes on the Data

Equity Returns Data

- **US:** From 1900 to 1968, US equity series returns come from the Global Financial Data S&P 500 Index. This uses data from the Cowles/Standard & Poor's Index of stocks through 1918 and then the Standard Composite after 1918. This index was calculated by the Standard Statistics Company and initially consisted of a 90-stock average, which included 50 industrials, 20 rails, and 20 utilities. The 90-share index was used through 1957, when S&P introduced the S&P 500 stock average, including 425 industrials, 25 rails, and 50 utilities. From 1969 to the present, the data cited come directly from the S&P 500 Index.¹
- **UK:** Data from 1900 to June 1962 are based on the historical total return index of UK shares compiled by Global Financial Data, Inc. Returns from September 1962 to December 1964 are calculated for the FT-500 Non-Financials Index provided by data from the FT Actuaries Library. Total returns from January 1965 to December 1992 are based on the FTSE® Total Non-Financial Index calculated by Thomson Reuters Datastream, while from 1993 to the present, returns are based on the FTSE® All-Share Index, as calculated by FTSE®.
- **Japan:** From 1921 to 1968, Japan equity series returns come from Global Financial Data, Inc. The National Bank Index is used from January 1921 through December 1932, and the Oriental Economist Index is used from 1933 through September 1948. The Fisher Index is used from September 1948 through April 1949. The Tokyo stock exchange officially reopened in May 1949, and the Nikkei 225 Index is used from May 1949 until 1969. From 1969 on, the MSCI Japan Index is used and the data cited come from MSCI Inc. Total return data for the MSCI Japan Index are net of dividend taxes.
- **Australia:** From 1912 to 1968, Australia equity series returns come from Global Financial Data, Inc. The All Ordinaries Index is used over this time frame as it is Australia's premier market indicator. The index represents the 500 largest companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. From 1969 on, the MSCI Australia Index is used and the data cited come from MSCI Inc. Total return data for the MSCI Australia Index are net of dividend taxes.

¹ As of January 1, 1988, S&P 500 total return calculations are based on daily reinvestment of accrued dividends on ex-date.

Notes on the Data

Equity Returns Data (continued)

- **Emerging Markets:** Data are sourced from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index from 1987, the index inception date. Returns used in exhibits are based on a spliced series of gross and net of dividend tax returns due to availability of the net return series. From 1987 through 2000, gross returns are used. From 2001 onwards, net returns are used. For graphs showing emerging markets compared to developed markets, the gross/net splicing methodology is also used for developed markets, and data are shown in USD terms for comparative purposes. For initial valuation and subsequent return charts, emerging markets returns are shown in local currency terms.

Notes on the Data

Equity Valuations Data

- **US:** Earnings data and dividend yields from 1900 to 1926 are provided by Professor Robert J. Shiller.² Earnings and dividend yields after 1927 are provided by Standard & Poor's. Graphs using MSCI price-earnings (P/E) ratios come from MSCI Inc. from 1969 to present.
- **UK:** Earnings and dividend yield data from 1962 through the present are calculated based on data provided by FTSE International Limited. Graphs using MSCI P/E ratios come from MSCI Inc. from 1969 to present.
- **Japan:** Earnings and dividend yield data from 1969 through the present are calculated based on data provided by MSCI Inc.
- **Australia:** Earnings and dividend yield data from 1969 through the present are calculated based on data provided by MSCI Inc.
- **Emerging Markets:** Earnings and dividend yield data from 1995 through the present are calculated based on data provided by MSCI Inc.
- When analyzing equity markets, a common valuation metric is the normalized P/E ratio. One well-known normalized P/E ratio is the Shiller P/E, which is calculated by dividing the real index price level by the ten-year average real earnings.² For most equity markets, Cambridge Associates evaluates valuations using our composite normalized P/E ratio, which is calculated by dividing the inflation-adjusted index price by the simple average of three normalized earnings metrics: ten-year average real earnings (i.e., Shiller earnings), trend-line earnings, and return on equity-adjusted earnings. The ROE P/E ratio, used in several regions, is calculated by multiplying the current P/E ratio by the ratio of current ROE to long-term median ROE.

² Page 50 of this report shows a Shiller P/E chart back to 1880 using data provided by Professor Robert J. Shiller before 1936.

Notes on the Data

Bond Data

The long-term bond series for each region is calculated and provided by Global Financial Data, Inc.

- **US:** From 1900 to September 1917, the 4% US Government Bonds of 1925 are used. Where no trades were recorded during a given month, the previous month's yield was used. The sources for this data is William B. Dana Co., *The Financial Review*, New York: William B. Dana Co. (1872–1921), which reprinted data published by *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*. The 4% Liberty Bonds are used from October 1917 through December 1918, and beginning in 1919, the Federal Reserve Board's 10–15 Year Treasury Bond Index is used. Ten-year bonds are used beginning in 1941.
- **UK:** The British consol is used from 1900 until 1934. The United Kingdom 3% Funding Loan of 1934 (Redeemable 1959–1969) is used from July 1934 until July 1947 and the United Kingdom 2.50% Treasury Bonds of 1947 (Redeemable after 1975) is used from August 1947 until December 1978. The Bank of England's index of ten-year bonds is used from January 1979 on. The benchmark bond is used for this series. The benchmark bond is the bond that is closest to the stated maturity without exceeding it. When the government issues a new bond of the stated maturity, it replaces the bond used for the index to keep the maturity as close to the stated time period as possible. Depending on how much of a difference there is in maturities, there may be some adjustment in the yield when the new bond is introduced.

Notes on the Data

Bond Data (continued)

- **Japan:** The Empire of Japan 4% Sterling Bonds of 1899 is used from 1900 to 1930. Tokyo quotes begin in 1931. Tokyo quotes for the 5% Japanese Bond are used from 1931 through 1946. No data are available from January 1947 until November 1948. The data from 1948 until September 1961 represent the yields on bonds newly issued during that month. When no bonds were issued, the previous month's yield was used. The series beginning from October 1961 to December 1971 is for seven-year government bonds. Data from January 1972 to present uses the yield on the ten-year government bond. The benchmark bond is used for this series. The benchmark bond is the bond that is closest to the stated maturity without exceeding it. When the government issues a new bond of the stated maturity, it replaces the bond used for the index to keep the maturity as close to the stated time period as possible. Depending on how much of a difference there is in maturities, there may be some adjustment in the yield when the new bond is introduced.
- **Australia:** The New South Wales 3% Inscribed Bond due 1935 is used from January 1900 to November 1917, the Australia 5.50% External Debt of 1917 (Redeemable 1922–1927) is used from December 1917 to June 1922, the Australia 5% Registered Bond of 1922 (Redeemable 1935–1945) is used from July 1922 to August 1933. From 1933 until 1936, 4% bonds are used. Starting in 1937, a weighted average of bonds of 10 years through 1940, 12 years from 1941 to May 1959, 20 years from June 1959 through 1980, 15 years from 1981 through 1990, and 10 years since 1991 is used to produce the theoretical yield on a perpetual ten-year bond.

Notes on the Data

Cash Data

- **US:** The money market instrument return series is composed of the Global Financial Data USA AA-Rated 3-Month Non-Financial Commercial Paper Index from 1900 through 1918. From 1919 to March 1970, the Global Financial Data USA T-Bill Index is used. From April 1970 to December 1977, T-bill data were sourced directly from the Federal Reserve. From January 1978 to the present, the BofA Merrill Lynch 91-Day Treasury Bill Index total return is used.
- **UK:** The Global Financial Data United Kingdom Total Return Bills Index is used from 1900 through January 1985. To calculate total returns, the index uses the yield on Treasury bills. The United Kingdom 3-Month Treasury Bill Index is used from February 1985 to the present, as sourced from the UK Debt Management Office via Thomson Reuters Datastream.
- **Japan:** The Global Financial Data Japan Total Return Bills Index is used. To calculate total returns, the Bank of Japan Discount Rate is used from 1900 to 1913, the Overnight Call Money rate from 1914 to January 1945, the Bank of Japan Discount Rate from February 1945 to 1948, the overnight call money rate from 1949 to 1959 and Treasury bill yields from 1960 on.
- **Australia:** The Global Financial Data Australia Total Return Bills Index is used. To calculate total returns, the index uses the bank deposit rate from 1900 until June 1928 and Treasury bill yields thereafter.

Notes on the Data

Inflation Data

- **US:** From January 1900 to January 1913, the Global Financial Data US BLS Consumer Price Index is used. From February 1913 to present the US Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) is used. Data for both series are non-seasonally adjusted.
- **UK:** From January 1900 to February 1956, the Global Financial Data United Kingdom Consumer Price Index is used. From March 1956 to November 2003, the UK Retail Price Index is used. From December 2003 to present, the UK Consumer Price Index is used. Retail and Consumer Price Index data are sourced from the Office for National Statistics and are based on the non-seasonally adjusted series.
- **Japan:** From January 1922 to January 1957, the Global Financial Data Japan Consumer Price Index series is used. From February 1957 to present, the Japan Consumer Price Index is used, as sourced from the Japan Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communication. Data are non-seasonally adjusted.
- **Australia:** From January 1912 to March 1950, the Global Financial Data Australia Consumer Price Index is used. From June 1950 to present, the Australia Consumer Price Index, as sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, is used. Data are non-seasonally adjusted. Australia CPI data are only reported on a quarterly basis. For intra-quarter months we calculate CPI levels using a linear interpolation based on the reported quarter-end data points.
- **Emerging Markets:** Where USD returns are used, as with the US data, we use the US Department of Labor – Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI-U inflation measure. Where local currency returns are used, we use a proprietary basket inflation measure based on the prevailing country exposures and weights of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index at each given period. The inflation basket is calculated as the weighted average of each country’s official non-seasonally adjusted consumer price index, with weights derived from the country’s allocation in the index. The constituency of the inflation series is dynamic over time as countries are reclassified into and out of the emerging markets index.

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- The 91-Day Treasury Bill Index sources the BofA Merrill Lynch 91-Day Treasury Bills Index from January 1978 to present.
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