CA

CAMBRIDGE ASSOCIATES LLC U.S. MARKET COMMENTARY THE UNLOVED MEGA-CAPS

August 2006

Sean McLaughlin Maggie Patton Taekyung Han

Copyright © 2006 by Cambridge Associates LLC. All rights reserved.

This report may not be displayed, reproduced, distributed, transmitted, or used to create derivative works in any form, in whole or in portion, by any means, without written permission from Cambridge Associates LLC ("CA"). Copying of this publication is a violation of federal copyright laws (17 U.S.C. 101 et seq.). Violators of this copyright may be subject to liability for substantial monetary damages. The information and material published in this report are confidential and non-transferable. This means that authorized members may not disclose any information or material derived from this report to third parties, or use information or material from this report, without prior written authorization. An authorized member may disclose information or material from this report to its staff, trustees, or Investment Committee with the understanding that these individuals will treat it confidentially. Additionally, information from this report may be disclosed if disclosure is required by law or court order, but members are required to provide notice to CA reasonably in advance of such disclosure. This report is provided for informational purposes only. It is not intended to constitute an offer of securities of any of the issuers that are described in the report. This report is provided only to persons that CA believes to be "Accredited Investors" as that term is defined in Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933. When applicable, investors should completely review all Fund offering materials before considering an investment. No part of this report is intended as a recommendation of any firm or any security. Factual information contained herein about investment firms and their returns which has not been independently verified has generally been collected from the firms themselves through the mail. CA can neither assure nor accept responsibility for accuracy, but substantial legal liability may apply to misrepresentations of results delivered through the mail. The CA manager universe statistics, including medians, are derived from CA's proprietary database covering investment managers. These universe statistics and rankings exclude managers that exclude cash from their reported total returns, and for calculations including any years from 1998 to the present, those managers with less than \$50 million in product assets. Returns for inactive (discontinued) managers are included if performance is available for the entire period measured. Performance results are generally gross of investment management fees. CA does not necessarily endorse or recommend the managers in this universe.

Cambridge Associates LLC is a Massachusetts limited liability company headquartered in Boston, MA with branch offices in Arlington, VA; Dallas, TX; and Menlo Park, CA. Cambridge Associates Limited is a Massachusetts limited liability company headquartered in Boston, MA and registered in England and Wales (No. FC022523, Branch No. BR005540). Cambridge Associates Limited also is registered to conduct business in Sydney, Australia (ARBD 109 366 654). Cambridge Associates Asia Pte Ltd is a Singapore corporation (Registration No. 200101063G).

The Unloved Mega-Caps: Price-Earnings Ratios Make the Case for Overweighting the Very Largest Firms within a U.S. Equity Allocation

The very largest stocks in the U.S. equity market have been a ponderous, \$6 trillion yoke around the neck of major indices since the market's low point in early 2003. An investor who shorted the mega-cap S&P 100 Index¹ and went long the 400 remaining stocks in the S&P 500 at the beginning of March 2003, devoting equal dollars to both sides of the trade, would have earned a 22% cumulative return on the investment before transaction costs, with very little volatility, compared to a higher but much more volatile return of 61.3% for the S&P 500 as a whole (Table A). In general, large-cap stocks have yet to fully recover their losses from the first years of this decade (the S&P 500 returned -3.5% from the end of 1999 to July 31, 2006), but the market's largest capitalization slice has suffered mightily, with the S&P 100 losing 17.1% of its value over the period. As a result, its weighting in the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Index has shrunk to 39% from 47% in 2002 (Table B).

Why have these stocks lost value during a strong economic cycle? The first reason is that investors very sensibly ceased to extrapolate spectacular earnings growth into the distant future (as they had done, for example, in the late 1990s), leading to shrinking price-earnings (P/E) multiples even as the "e" in the ratio rebounded. In fact, the trailing 12-month P/E ratio of the S&P 100 had fallen to 17.28 by the end of July, moderately lower than the 18.85 average P/E over the available history, which extends to 1973 (Table C). Before this summer, the last time we saw P/E values of 17 for the S&P 100 Index was at the end of 1995. However, the normalized real P/E ratio, which divides the price by the average of the past ten years' earnings, and serves as a proxy for sustainable earnings, stood at 22.22 at the end of July, compared to a post-1982 average of 18.5. The divergence in recent years between the normalized P/E (which has been relatively steady) versus the trailing 12-month P/E is due to very strong recent earnings.

U.S. mega-cap equities therefore seem reasonably valued in absolute terms and a bargain relative to the U.S. mid- and small-cap corners of the market (and even compared to most of the large-cap universe) (Tables D and E). However, the valuation picture is not uniform across the sector's entire landscape. For example, in half of the industrial sectors, S&P 100 valuations are higher than those for S&P 500 companies. Thus, S&P 100 utility stocks have a P/E 27% higher than that of S&P 500 utility stocks. Nevertheless, P/E ratios in the mega-cap index are lower for most of the sectors that constitute the largest portions of the induces—technology, health care, and financials, for example (Table F).

In this context, it is perhaps worth noting that the sector make up of the S&P 100 has changed significantly over the past decade, roughly in step with that of the broad market. Financial shares made up

¹ The S&P 100 may not be the purest measure of mega-cap stock, but is a reasonable proxy, for which there is a reasonably long data series. It should be noted, however, that this index is not in fact composed of the 100 largest stocks in the U.S. market. In fact, the 100th largest stock in the United States has a market capitalization greater than \$25 billion, while more than one-third of the stocks in the S&P 100 Index have market capitalizations below that threshold. The S&P 100's constituents are selected to maintain sector balance, and they are, in the words of Standard & Poor's, "generally among the largest and most established companies in the S&P 500," but they are not simply the largest 100 S&P 500 companies.

less than 9% of the index ten years ago, and now account for 21.4% (Table G). Technology shares boasted a 38.6% share of the index in mid-2000, as high valuations and strong earnings boosted the weightings of firms including Microsoft Corp. and Intel Corp. Today, Intel shares trade at just 16 times trailing 12-month earnings (between the valuations of Continental Airlines and Allstate Corp.), and just 13.5% of the S&P 100's capitalization is now in the technology sector.


Slicing up the S&P 500 Index into market capitalization deciles allows us to gauge valuation dynamics in the largest slice of the stock market. The largest decile, which accounts for 48.2% of the S&P 500's market cap, is the cheapest decile by a significant margin, with a capitalization-weighted P/E of 17.8, compared to 19.0 for the next cheapest slice (Table H). Slicing even finer, the largest 25 stocks in the index, which account for 35.4% of the index's market capitalization, have still lower valuations, with a P/E of 15.9. The remaining 448 stocks in the index with positive earnings have a P/E ratio of 23.0.

If mega-cap U.S. stocks already exercise a dominant influence on the broad market, why consider overweighting them further? In addition to compelling relative valuations, these companies display impressive balance sheets. Although debt-to-equity levels across the index have increased fairly steadily over the past 15 years, and total debt has increased by about \$2 trillion since 2000 (Table I), the non-financial firms in the S&P 100 have seen their debt-to-equity ratios fall steadily from 128.1% in 1990 to 82.4% today. In addition to paying down debt, they have also been piling up cash. In 2005, the index's constituents held \$1.9 trillion in cash and cash equivalents—that is nearly 30% of market capitalization under the mattress, compared with 21.7% of the full S&P 500 and 20.2% of the S&P 1500 (Table J).


Cash-rich firms seem to be having difficulty deploying this largesse into internal growth or external acquisitions, and so they are increasingly giving it back to shareholders. Dividends have remained relatively steady, with few chief executive officers committing to major increases, but share buybacks have become larger and more common (even after adjusting for buybacks that are primarily designed to facilitate new grants of stock options and restricted stock to executives). The dividend yield of the S&P 100 is just 2.3%, but the yield together with net stock buybacks has skyrocketed from only 2.1% five years ago to 7.4% today (Table K).

A handful of active managers specialize in very large stocks. Otherwise, long exposure to the S&P 100 and the Russell Top 50TM (another mega-cap metric) can be implemented quite easily using exchange-traded funds or other means.

In short, our case for mega-cap U.S. equities is based on three observations: first, valuations are reasonable in absolute terms and compelling in relative terms; second, as a group, these firms' financials are remarkably sound; and finally, our cautious view of U.S. equities in general predisposes us to seek the relative safety of the strongest, fittest, richest companies since these are better equipped to weather stormy weather than are smaller firms with thinner hulls.







Sources: Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Factset Research Systems, Standard & Poor's, and Wilshire Associates.

Note: Market capitalization for the Wilshire 5000 Index represent the full capitalization-weighted index.






Table D

EQUITY VALUATIONS OF THE S&P 100 INDEX






Sources: Factset Research Systems and Standard & Poor's.

Notes: Return on equity is calculated by dividing the index's price-book ratio by its price-earnings ratio. Price-tocash earnings data begin in July 31, 1999. Campbell Soup Company was excluded from price-to-book and return on equity graphs in the fourth quarter of 2002 due to negative book values.

Table E


RELATIVE PRICE-EARNINGS MULTIPLES

January 1, 1992 - July 31, 2006



Sources: Frank Russell Company, Standard & Poor's, and Thomson Datastream.

Note: S&P 100 Price-earnings ratios were constructed using Datastream calculated figures from December 1978 to November 1984, Compustat data from December 1984 to December 1991, and actual Standard and Poor's index data from January 1992 to present.



Note: S&P 100 sector weights exclude companies with negative price-earnings ratio.





Table G

SECTOR ALLOCATIONS OF THE S&P 100 INDEX

July 31, 1996 - July 31, 2006

Sources: Factset Research Systems and Standard and Poor's.

Note: Chart represents annual data ending on July 31.







Table J

CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF THE S&P 100 INDEX

1990-2005

_	1990	1995	2000	2005
Cash and Equivalent	151,944	271,270	895,373	1,860,618
Market Capitalization	912,336	1,876,984	6,518,492	6,261,908
% of Mkt Cap	16.65	14.45	13.74	29.71
# of Cos Anaylzed	89	92	97	100



Sources: Factset Research Systems, Standard & Poor's, and Standard & Poor's Compustat.

Note: Figures are based on actual calendar year data.

