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PROSPECTS FOR U.S. EQUITIES REMAIN BLEAK

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## Prospects for U.S. Equities Remain Bleak

Since the start of 2005, we have warned that earnings were likely at or close to a cyclical peak for the following reasons: ${ }^{1}$

- Real earnings growth had expanded significantly and was well above normalized levels.
- Earnings growth had started to decelerate.
- Earnings have been heavily supported by financials, which accounts for $21 \%$ of the market capitalization of the S\&P 500, and accounted for $42.9 \%$ of earnings in 2002, decreasing gradually to $26.6 \%$ in 2005. Financials, whose profits have been boosted by highly volatile businesses such as proprietary trading and issuance of low-quality credit products, appear to be facing narrowing profit opportunities.
- As financials' contribution to earnings growth waned in 2005, the energy sector picked up the slack. Continued support to energy prices, and therefore, energy company profits, cannot be expected to persist.

These concerns remain, and we continue to believe that earnings will begin a cyclical downward adjustment that is not currently priced into the market. Had it not been for the significant increase in energy prices, earnings growth would have been much more subdued, as the energy sector alone accounted for nearly $40 \%$ of the $13.9 \%$ growth in 2005 earnings (Table A). While earnings continue to climb and are now up $158.9 \%$ in real terms from their trough on March 31, 2002 through March 31, 2006, real earnings growth has been decelerating for two years. Compared to the 15 previous earnings cycles since 1900 in which earnings increased at least $15 \%$ in real terms, this earnings cycle ranks fifth in terms of magnitude, with real earnings growth well in excess of the $113.8 \%$ average and $65.0 \%$ median (Table B). In addition, having now lasted 16.3 quarters through the end of April, this cycle has just surpassed the average duration of 16.1 quarters and the median of 15 quarters. Real earnings are now $62.6 \%$ above trendline, the highest spread above trendline since 1917, and the third highest spread since our data begins in 1900 (Table C).

Despite the length and magnitude of this earnings cycle, consensus expectations are for earnings to grow $13.1 \%$ in 2006 and $10.6 \%$ in 2007, and have generally increased for both years since hurricane Katrina hit in September of 2005 (Table D). Financials are expected to contribute $35.0 \%$ to S\&P 500 earnings growth in 2006 and $22.7 \%$ in 2007. Expectations for the energy sector have moderated, however, and are expected to represent $15.3 \%$ of earnings growth in 2006 and only $5.2 \%$ in 2007 . The tech sector is expected to take up the slack in 2007, increasing from $10.5 \%$ of growth in 2006 to $18.5 \%$ in 2007 (Table A).

While the liquidity that has fueled the financial sector is still accommodative, it appears to be abating, as U.S. policy rates are approaching levels most economists consider to be neutral. Meanwhile, the European Central Bank has started tightening, and the Japanese Central Bank has ended quantitative easing and is expected to begin gradually raising rates this year. The mortgage boom, which also provided a strong source of earnings to financials, seems likely to moderate since home prices appear to have peaked and ten-

[^0]$\mathrm{C} \mid \mathrm{A}$
year interest rates have increased modestly, breaking through $5 \%$ for the first time since 2002. In addition, the U.S. yield curve, which inverted earlier this year, remains flat and the U.K. yield curve remains inverted, further limiting financial stocks' abilities to earn strong profits. Research by J.P. Morgan reveals that over the last 33 years, a combination of at least a $20 \%$ year-over-year increase in oil prices and relatively flat yield curve, defined as a spread of 100 basis points or less between the ten-year yield and the Fed funds rate, were followed by a decline in S\&P earnings averaging $11 \%$ over the next 12 months. Of course, such occurrences have been rare ( 17 quarters in 33 years) and were clustered in three periods: 1979-81, 1990-91, and 2000-01. All three periods began while the Fed was tightening and ended in recession, even as they started with strong, albeit slowing, economic growth and slowing or declining earnings growth. While every period is different, there are some important similarities between these historical periods and the current environment including high GDP growth (although it is not yet clear if GDP has peaked), decelerating earnings growth, and Fed tightening.

There are some positive factors for earnings that could result in sustained growth, but it remains difficult to justify above average expectations in the current environment. As The Bank Credit Analyst pointed out in their recent special report on the health of U.S. corporations, ${ }^{2}$ even though much of the strength in profit growth has been attributable to cyclical factors, a strong secular increase in productivity has led to an improvement in corporate health that has both improved margins and allowed real compensation levels to increase. Corporations' strong financial position and continued drive to increase productivity in the face of stiff global price competition should continue to provide some support to earnings, even as cyclical influences wane. However, it seems unduly optimistic to expect earnings to expand at rates well above historical averages this far into the earnings cycle. The long-term arithmetic average of real earnings growth has been approximately $4 \%$. Assuming the inflation expectations of $2.7 \%$ priced into the bond market for the next ten years proves correct, we would expect nominal earnings to fall below $6.7 \%$.

Since the S\&P 500's most recent trough on October 9, 2002, returns have been driven primarily by earnings growth, as price-earnings (P/E) multiples have contracted from 25.6 to 18.1 and despite significant increases in dividends, dividend yields remain low and have fallen from $2.0 \%$ to $1.7 \%$ through the end of April. If we assume, somewhat optimistically, that nominal earnings growth over the next five years is $6.7 \%$ and $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ ratios and dividend yields hold at current levels, this would suggest a five-year average annual compound return of roughly $8.5 \%$, somewhat below our long-term, valuation-neutral U.S. equity return expectations of $9.7 \%$ ( $7 \%$ real return plus $2.7 \%$ inflation). However, if $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ ratios were to contract, as we would expect, a decline back to their post-1960 average of 17.5 would bring the five-year return down to $7.8 \%$, while a more severe $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ contraction to 1 standard deviation below this average, or a $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ of 10.4 , would bring returns down to $-2.6 \%$. We would also caution that markets are anticipatory and do not always wait for earnings to decline before pricing in lowered earnings growth expectations. In fact, of the 15 most significant peak-to-trough S\&P 500 declines since 1926, nine began while earnings were still rising (Table E).

[^1]$\mathrm{C} \mid \mathrm{A}$

In short, the risks to U.S. equity investors remain high. Consensus earnings expectations seem too high considering the strong market headwinds and advanced nature of the earnings cycle, while valuations remain elevated.
$\mathrm{C} \mid \mathrm{A}$
Table A
EARNINGS GROWTH CONTRIBUTION OF S\&P 500 SECTORS—ACTUAL AND FORECAST

Sources: FactSet, Morgan Stanley Research, and Thomson Financial. Notes: In 2005, the S\&P 500 earnings grew $13.9 \%$ and is estimated to grow $13.1 \%$ and $10.6 \%$ for 2006 and 2007, respectively. The earnings growth contribution numbers divide the US\$ change in earnings per sector by the overall US\$ change for the S\&P 500 Index.
$\mathrm{C} \mid \mathrm{A}$
Table B
HISTORY OF EARNINGS CYCLES

| Rising Earnings Cycles |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Start Date | End Date | Duration (quarters) | Cumulative <br> Real <br> Earnings <br> Growth (\%) | Annualized Real Earnings Growth (\%) | Cumulative Real Price Appreciation (\%) | Annualized Real Price Appreciation (\%) | Beginning Period P/E | Ending Period P/E |
| 1Q 1900 | 4Q 1902 | 12 | 22.50 | 7.66 | 20.02 | 6.86 | 13.04 | 12.78 |
| 1Q 1905 | 3Q 1906 | 7 | 48.84 | 25.51 | 20.22 | 11.10 | 16.92 | 13.60 |
| 1Q 1909 | 4Q 1910 | 8 | 23.27 | 11.03 | -1.84 | -0.93 | 14.27 | 12.40 |
| 1Q 1915 | 4Q 1916 | 8 | 156.18 | 60.06 | 16.09 | 7.75 | 12.41 | 6.41 |
| 1Q 1922 | 4Q 1929 | 32 | 458.40 | 23.98 | 195.14 | 14.49 | 19.85 | 13.32 |
| 1Q 1933 | 2Q 1937 | 18 | 210.64 | 28.64 | 103.33 | 17.08 | 14.01 | 11.00 |
| 2Q 1938 | 1Q 1941 | 12 | 125.67 | 31.17 | 16.35 | 5.18 | 20.28 | 7.97 |
| 4Q 1946 | 4Q 1940 | 17 | 160.39 | 25.25 | 11.33 | 2.56 | 14.43 | 7.19 |
| 3Q 1952 | 1Q 1956 | 15 | 55.93 | 12.58 | 92.11 | 19.02 | 10.40 | 13.14 |
| 4Q 1958 | 4Q 1966 | 33 | 69.28 | 6.59 | 40.96 | 4.25 | 19.10 | 14.47 |
| 1Q 1971 | 3Q 1974 | 15 | 39.68 | 9.32 | -45.76 | -15.05 | 19.22 | 6.97 |
| 4Q 1975 | 3Q 1979 | 16 | 37.99 | 8.38 | -4.60 | -1.17 | 11.33 | 7.47 |
| 3Q 1983 | 4Q 1984 | 6 | 24.89 | 15.97 | -6.00 | -4.04 | 12.49 | 10.05 |
| 3Q 1987 | 1Q 1989 | 7 | 60.64 | 31.11 | -9.98 | -5.83 | 20.29 | 11.81 |
| 1Q 1992 | 3Q 2000 | 35 | 166.95 | 11.88 | 173.43 | 12.18 | 24.93 | 26.75 |
| 2Q 2002 | 1Q 2006 | 16 | 158.89 | 26.85 | 0.99 | 0.25 | 37.02 | 18.12 |
|  | Mean | 16.06 | 113.76 | 21.00 | 38.86 | 4.61 | 17.50 | 12.09 |
|  | Median | 15 | 64.96 | 19.98 | 16.22 | 4.71 | 15.67 | 12.11 |
|  | High | 35 | 458.40 | 60.06 | 195.14 | 19.02 | 37.02 | 26.75 |
|  | Low | 6 | 22.50 | 6.59 | -45.76 | -15.05 | 10.40 | 6.41 |

$\mathrm{C} \mid \mathrm{A}$
Table B (continued)

Sources: Calculated from data provided by Standard \& Poor's, Standard \& Poor's Compustat, and The Wall Street Journal .


## Table C

## S\&P 500 REAL EARNINGS, PRICE LEVELS AND YEAR-OVER-YEAR EARNINGS GROWTH SINCE 1900



Year-over-Year Real Earnings Growth (\%)


Sources: Calculated from data provided by Standard \& Poor's, Standard \& Poor's Compustat, and The Wall Street Journal.

Notes: Graphs for real earnings and price levels are shown in logarithmic scales. Real price levels are calculated based on 1900 dollars. Data are through first quarter 2006, and first quarter 2006 data is preliminary.
$\mathrm{C} \mid \mathrm{A}$
S\&P 500 ANALYST EARNINGS GROWTH EXPECTATIONS FOR 2006 AND 2007
 basis.
$\mathrm{C} \mid \mathrm{A}$
Table E


\section*{| $—$ Real Earnings | $\cdots \cdot$ Real Price Levels |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |}

Sources: Calculated from data provided by Standard \& Poor's, Standard \& Poor's Compustat, and The Wall Street Journal.
Notes: Real earnings and real price levels are shown in logarithmic scales. Real price levels are calculated based on 2006 dollars. Data are from first quarter 1900 to first quarter 2006, and first quarter 2006 data is preliminary. Shaded areas show rising earnings levels and non-shaded areas show falling earnings levels.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ See our March 2005 U.S. Market Commentary: Earnings Growth: Don't Bank On It, and our September 2005 U.S. Market Commentary: Are Earnings Running Out of Gas?

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ See The Bank Credit Analyst, "U.S. Corporate Health: A Glowing Report Card," February 2006.

