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# U.S. MARKET COMMENT: <br> OF BUBBLES AND BEARS <br> HISTORY'S MESSAGE 

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#### Abstract

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## Of Bubbles and Bears

## History's Message

Despite its apparent ferocity, the current bear market has in fact been relatively lenient to equity investors compared to the bruising they suffered in the aftermath of past bubbles. If equity prices unwind in a pattern similar to prior post-mania phases, the damage may be far from over.

## What Typically Happens After a Bubble

Whether in capital markets, currencies, or commodities, bubbles tend to give back all, and usually more, of their prior gains (see Table A). After such manias, it usually takes years, sometimes decades, for prices to return to their prior peaks, in the process typically grinding out below-average returns. For example:

- The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) peaked in 1929, after which it took 25 years (1954) until the composite returned to its pre-crash level.
- The DJIA reached a secular top in 1966, and it was not until 17 years later that it broke through that peak, marking the commencement of the next secular bull market.
- Ten-year U.S. Treasury bond yields peaked in 1981, and, 21 years later, the rally in Treasuries continues.
- Japan's Nikkei 225 peaked in 1989, and, 13 years later, shows no signs of reflating. It currently trades at the point where it was in 1983.
- The real trade-weighted US\$ peaked in 1985 , and by 2002,17 years later, remains about $12 \%$ below that peak.
- The Commodities Research Bureau's Index peaked in 1980. Twenty-two years later, that height is only a distant memory. Oil, cocoa, gold, and nickel remain far short of the prices at which they sold 15 to 20 years ago.


## After Secular Equity Bull Markets

Typically, the equity market retraces a substantial portion of its gains earned during the prior bull market before advancing to the subsequent rise (see Table B). Since 1896, cyclical and secular bear markets have, on average, given back $89 \%$ of these gains.

The largest cumulative appreciation in the DJIA, $344.5 \%$, occurred between October 27, 1923 and September 3, 1929. One hundred dollars invested at the top in 1929 would have been reduced to $\$ 42.40$ by 1949 (see Table C). Despite significant bull markets ( $93.9 \%, 120.8 \%, 127.3 \%$, and $128.7 \%$ ), it took 25 years for investors to dig themselves out of the hole created from the 1929 and 1932 crashes. By 1954, when the DJIA finally broke through the level last reached in 1929, it had returned average annual compound returns of $0.1 \%$ and $-1.7 \%$ in nominal and real terms, respectively, over the intervening 25 years (see Table D).

The DJIA next peaked again in 1966, and it was not until 1982 that the composite broke through that level to begin the next secular bull market. One hundred dollars invested at the peak in February 1966 would have been reduced to $\$ 78.04$ in 1982, despite several sharp rallies ( $50.6 \%$ and $75.7 \%$ ). From 1966 to 1982, the composite posted annual nominal and real returns of $0.0 \%$ and $-6.5 \%$.

In the current bear market, major equity indexes have surrendered all the gains they made over the last four years. Since their peaks in 2000 through June 30, 2002, the S\&P 500 has returned $-35.2 \%$, returning to levels last visited in November 1997; the DJIA, -21.2\%, falling to its December 1998 level; and the Nasdaq, $-71.0 \%$, revisiting its level of June 1997. One hundred dollars invested at the DJIA's September 6, 2000 peak would have been reduced to $\$ 77.82$ by mid-July 2002.

Table G shows the average annual return over a certain number of years required for stocks to return to their peaks of 2000-and these returns may be far different than what investors are assuming. For the DJIA to recapture its January 2000 peak by July 2003, it would have to rise $34.2 \%$ over the next 12 months; by July 2004, $15.8 \%$ each year; by July 2012, $3.0 \%$ per year; and by 2027, $1.2 \%$ each year. For the S\&P 500 to return to its March 2000 peak over the next 12 months, it would have to rise $67.5 \%$; in two years, $29.4 \%$ each year; ten years, $5.3 \%$; and 25 years, $2.1 \%$.

If the past indicates anything about the future, there may be more downside risks in the current market. Prior post-mania periods provide ugly precedents: the 25 years from 1929 to 1954 when the DJIA posted an average annual real return of $-1.7 \%$, and the 17 years from 1966 to 1982, with an average annual real return of $-6.5 \%$. These precedents, however, may be preferable to the post-bubble periods for Japan's equity market, the US\$, and commodities: after 13 to 25 years, they still have not recaptured their prior peaks. Rather than playing the "is this the bottom?" game, investors should perhaps be prepared for a long, hard slog in case the unwinding of the recent bubble conforms to the pattern typical of postspeculative busts.

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Table A
BUBBLES OF MAJOR INDEXES, THE USS. DOLLAR AND COMMODITIES

Vas daq Composite (1996-2002)


S\&P 500 (1992-2002)


10 Year U.S. Treasury (1977-2002)


DJIA (1964-82)


DJIA (1925-49)


Nikkei 225 Index ( $\mathbf{( 1 9 8 6 - 2 0 0 2 )}$


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Table A (continued)

## BUBBLES OF MAJOR INDEXES, THE U.S. DOLLAR AND COMMODITIES



Crude Oil (1962-2002)


Gold (1970-2002)


Bridge - CRB Commodity Index
(1980-2002)


Cocoa (1970-2002)


Nickel (1979-2002)


Sources: Global Financial Data, Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo \& Company, Ned Davis Research, The Wall Street Journal, and Thomson Financial Datastream.

Notes: Data for 2002 are as of June 30. Data are denominated in U.S. dollars (\$), unless otherwise noted.
Table B
RETRACEMENT RATIOS OF THE DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE FOLLOWING BULL MARKET PEAKS

| Date of | Date of | Trough to Peak |  | Date of Subsequent | Peak to Subsequent Trough |  | Retracement |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Trough | Peak | Percent rise | \# of Months | Troughs | Percent Decline | \# of Months | Ratio (\%) |
| 8/8/1896 | 9/10/1897 | 96.0 | 13.1 | 3/25/1898 | -24.8 | 6.4 | 50.6 |
| 3/25/1898 | 4/25/1899 | 84.0 | 13.0 | 9/24/1900 | -31.5 | 17.0 | 69.0 |
| 9/24/1900 | 6/17/1901 | 47.8 | 8.7 | 11/9/1903 | -46.1 | 28.7 | 142.5 |
| 11/9/1903 | 1/19/1906 | 144.4 | 26.3 | 11/15/1907 | -48.5 | 21.8 | 82.1 |
| 11/15/1907 | 11/19/1909 | 89.7 | 24.1 | 9/25/1911 | -27.4 | 22.2 | 57.9 |
| 9/25/1911 | 9/30/1912 | 29.1 | 12.2 | 12/24/1914 | -43.5 | 26.8 | 193.0 |
| 12/24/1914 | 11/21/1916 | 107.2 | 22.9 | 12/19/1917 | -40.1 | 12.9 | 77.5 |
| 12/19/1917 | 11/3/1919 | 81.4 | 22.5 | 8/24/1921 | -46.6 | 21.7 | 103.8 |
| 8/24/1921 | 3/20/1923 | 64.9 | 18.8 | 10/27/1923 | -18.6 | 7.3 | 47.3 |
| 10/27/1923 | 9/3/1929 | 344.5 | 70.2 | 11/13/1929 | -47.9 | 2.3 | 61.8 |
| 11/13/1929 | 4/17/1930 | 48.0 | 5.1 | 7/8/1932 | -86.0 | 26.7 | 265.2 |
| 7/8/1932 | 9/7/1932 | 93.9 | 2.0 | 2/27/1933 | -37.2 | 5.7 | 76.8 |
| 2/27/1933 | 2/5/1934 | 120.8 | 11.3 | 7/26/1934 | -22.8 | 5.6 | 41.7 |
| 7/26/1934 | 3/10/1937 | 127.3 | 31.5 | 3/31/1938 | -49.1 | 12.7 | 87.7 |
| 3/31/1938 | 11/12/1938 | 60.1 | 7.4 | 4/8/1939 | -23.3 | 4.8 | 62.1 |
| 4/8/1939 | 9/12/1939 | 28.4 | 5.2 | 4/28/1942 | -40.4 | 31.5 | 182.7 |
| 4/28/1942 | 5/29/1946 | 128.7 | 49.0 | 5/17/1947 | -23.2 | 11.6 | 41.2 |
| 5/17/1947 | 6/15/1948 | 18.4 | 13.0 | 6/13/1949 | -16.3 | 11.9 | 104.9 |
| 6/13/1949 | 4/6/1956 | 222.4 | 81.8 | 10/22/1957 | -19.4 | 18.5 | 28.1 |
| 10/22/1957 | 1/5/1960 | 63.3 | 26.4 | 10/25/1960 | -17.4 | 9.7 | 44.9 |
| 10/25/1960 | 12/13/1961 | 29.8 | 13.6 | 6/26/1962 | -27.1 | 6.4 | 118.0 |
| 6/26/1962 | 2/9/1966 | 85.7 | 43.5 | 10/7/1966 | -25.2 | 7.9 | 54.6 |
| 10/7/1966 | 12/3/1968 | 32.4 | 25.9 | 5/26/1970 | -35.9 | 17.7 | 146.7 |
| 5/26/1970 | 4/28/1971 | 50.6 | 11.1 | 11/23/1971 | -16.1 | 6.9 | 47.9 |
| 11/23/1971 | 1/11/1973 | 31.8 | 13.6 | 12/6/1974 | -45.1 | 22.8 | 186.9 |
| 12/6/1974 | 9/21/1976 | 75.7 | 21.5 | 2/28/1978 | -26.9 | 17.2 | 62.4 |
| 2/28/1978 | 9/8/1978 | 22.3 | 6.3 | 4/21/1980 | -16.4 | 19.4 | 89.9 |
| 4/21/1980 | 4/27/1981 | 34.9 | 12.2 | 8/12/1982 | -24.1 | 15.5 | 93.2 |
| 8/12/1982 | 11/29/1983 | 65.7 | 15.6 | 7/24/1984 | -15.6 | 7.8 | 39.3 |
| 7/24/1984 | 8/25/1987 | 150.6 | 37.0 | 10/19/1987 | -36.1 | 1.8 | 60.1 |
| 10/19/1987 | 7/17/1990 | 72.5 | 32.9 | 10/11/1990 | -21.2 | 2.8 | 50.4 |
| 10/11/1990 | 7/17/1998 | 294.8 | 93.1 | 8/31/1998 | -19.3 | 1.5 | 25.8 |
| 8/31/1998 | 1/14/2000 | 55.5 | 16.6 | 3/7/2000 | -16.4 | 1.7 | 46.1 |
| 3/7/2000 | 9/6/2000 | 15.5 | 6.0 | 3/22/2001 | -17.0 | 6.5 | 126.8 |
| 3/22/2001 | 5/21/2001 | 20.8 | 1.9 | 9/21/2001 | -27.4 | 4.1 | 159.2 |
| 9/21/2001 | 3/19/2002 | 29.1 | 5.9 | 7/11/2002 | -17.2 | 3.8 | 76.4 |

[^0]Sources: Crandall, Pierce \& Company and Thomson Financial Datastream.

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Table C

DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE PEAKS AND TROUGHS
November 13, 1929 - June 13, 1949


Cumulative Wealth of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Peaks and Troughs
November 13, 1929 - June 13, 1949


Sources: Crandall, Pierce \& Company and Thomson Financial Datastream.
Note: Data represent price returns.
Table D


Table E

## DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE PEAKS AND TROUGHS

October 7, 1966 - August 12, 1982


Cumulative Wealth of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Peaks and Troughs
October 7, 1966 - August 12, 1982


Sources: Crandall, Pierce \& Company and Thomson Financial Datastream.
Note: Data represent price returns.

Table F

## DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE PEAKS AND TROUGHS

March 22, 2001 - July 11, 2002


Cumulative Wealth of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Peaks and Troughs
March 22, 2001 - July 11, 2002


Sources: Crandall, Pierce \& Company and Thomson Financial Datastream.
Note: Data represents price returns.

## Table G

## PROSPECTIVE ANNUAL RETURNS NEEDED TO RETURN TO PRIOR PEAK

|  | Dow Jones <br> Industrial Average | S\&P 500 <br> Index | Nasdaq <br> Composite |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| July 31, 2002 Price Level | $8,736.6$ | 911.6 |  |
| Peak Price Level | 11,723 | 1,527 | $1,328.3$ |
| Date of Peak | January 14, 2000 | March 24, 2000 | March 10, 2000 |


| Years to Peak | Prospective Returns (\%) |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 Year | 34.2 | 67.5 | 280.0 |
| 2 Years | 15.8 | 29.4 | 94.9 |
| 5 Years | 6.1 | 10.9 | 30.6 |
| 10 Years | 3.0 | 5.3 | 14.3 |
| 15 Years | 2.0 | 3.5 | 9.3 |
| 20 Years | 1.5 | 2.6 | 6.9 |
| 25 Years | 1.2 | 2.1 | 5.5 |

[^1]
[^0]:    Notes: Data represent price returns. Bull market is defined as a continuous period without a price decline of $15 \%$ or more. Retracement ratio is the amount lost, peak to trough, divided by the amount previously gained, trough to peak. It represents the percentage of the prior market rise eliminated by the subsequent period decline.

[^1]:    Sources: Thomson Financial Datastream and The Wall Street Journal.
    Notes: Data for 2002 are as of July 31. Returns are based on price levels.

